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I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
 
After the Battle of the Forms:  
Commercial Contracting in the Electronic Age 
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III* 
Abstract: Commercial parties continue to fight the battle of the 
forms, but electronic contracting is quickly rendering this practice 
obsolete. In this article I assess the legal landscape for commercial 
parties after the battle of the forms. In Section I, I briefly describe the 
(relatively) settled law under U.C.C. § 2-207.  I then describe how 
these rules permit commercial parties to erect a force-field to protect 
themselves from being subjected to unwanted terms, and the 
developments in web-based contracting and recent case law applying 
contract formation principles to electronic contracting. Finally, I 
discuss how the growth of electronic contracting will eliminate the 
battle of the forms that triggers the application of U.C.C. § 2-207, and 
also will make it difficult for commercial parties to replicate the force-
field protection to which they have grown accustomed.  
 
 
 
 
 
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, jay.mootz@unlv.edu.  This article grew out of a presentation at the ABA Section 
of Business Law Spring Meeting in Washington, D.C., on March 16, 2007.  An earlier 
version of this article was presented to the faculty of the William S. Boyd School of Law of 
UNLV in January 2008 and at the Fourth Annual International Conference on Contracts at 
the McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific in February 2008.  My thanks 
to those who attended one of these events and offered challenges, questions and support.  I 
also gratefully acknowledge the excellent research assistance and careful proofreading 
provided by Seth Zimmerman, a member of the Penn State Dickinson School of Law Class 
of 2007 and a cheerful survivor of my Sales class.  Caren Senter, Beth Cook and Jennifer 
Stull (a member of the Penn State Dickinson School of Law Class of 2008) were careful 
readers as I finalized this draft.  Dave Frisch, Eric Gouvin, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison, 
Juliet Moringiello, and Keith Rowley made helpful suggestions about how I might clarify 
my argument.  Finally, the anonymous peer reviewer for the I/S Journal offered very 
helpful suggestions for improving the article. 
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 In Section II, I discuss the two primary doctrinal options available 
to address contracting realities for commercial parties once the 
electronic age of contracting has eliminated the battle of the forms.  
The debacle surrounding Revised Article 2 suggests that the only 
plausible response, as the theater of operations shifts from the battle 
of the forms to the world of electronic contracting, will be judicial 
rather than legislative.  Although unconscionability analysis might be 
a plausible doctrine to address egregious cases, I conclude that the 
doctrine is too closely aligned with consumer protection to make it a 
viable theory for commercial parties.  Instead, I argue that 
rehabilitating the doctrine of reasonable expectations holds the most 
promise for addressing the commercial contracting world after the 
battle of the forms.  This approach enjoys the benefit of being 
grounded in Karl Llewellyn’s theory of the validity of standard form 
contracts, is consonant with one of the important guiding principles of 
Article 2, and will be sufficiently defined by the commercial context to 
permit consistent application by courts policing the margins of 
acceptable contracting practices. 
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I know of few “private” law problems which remotely rival 
the importance, economic, governmental, or “law”-legal, of 
the form-pad agreement; and I know of none which has been 
either more disturbing to life or more baffling to lawyers. 
     Karl Llewellyn1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Commercial parties continue to fight the “battle of the forms” by 
exchanging documents that do not mirror each other as their mode of 
contracting.2  The number of cases that raise questions under U.C.C. 
§ 2-207 may be small compared to the number that arose thirty years 
ago, but this decrease undoubtedly is explained in part by the 
 
1 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362 (1960). 
2 Recent cases that address classic “battle of the forms” issues arising out of the exchange of 
form documents during the contracting process are: Corestar Int’l Pte. Ltd. v. LPB 
Comm’n, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.N.J. 2007); Smith & Loveless, Inc. v. Caicos Corp., 
471 F.  Supp. 2d 1140 (D. Kan. 2007); Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. 
Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Nartron Corp. v. Tuthill Corp., No. 05-70323, 2006 WL 1494992 (E.D. Mich. May 25, 
2006); Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18 (Ky. App. 2006); Converting/Biophile 
Labs. v. Ludlow Composites Corp., No. 2005AP1628, 2006 WL 626308 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
15, 2006); Chainworks, Inc. v. Webco Indus., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-135, 2006 WL 461251 
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2006); Plastech Engineered Prods. v. Grand Haven Plastics, Inc., No. 
252532, 2005 WL 736519 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005); Nw. Aluminum Co. v. Hydro 
Aluminum Deutschland GmbH, No. Civ. 02-398-JE, 2003 WL 23571744 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 
2003); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int’l, Inc., 830 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); AgGrow 
Oils, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D.N.D. 2003); Aceros 
Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002); Elec. Techs. Int’l, 
L.L.C. v. Bennett Pump Co., No. 01-C-0553-C, 2002 WL 32349389 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 15, 
2002); Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. Gases, Inc., 790 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002). 
Of course, § 2-207 is also triggered when there is only a single form document that is 
submitted in response to an order or an oral agreement.  Recent cases include: Scotwood 
Indus. Inc. v. Frank Miller & Sons, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Kan. 2006); Posh Pooch 
Inc. v. Nieri Argenti s.a.s., No. 106419/2005, 2006 WL 435808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 
2006); Hansen-Rice, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 414 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Idaho 2006); In re 
Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2005); S. Ill. Riverboat Casino 
Cruises, Inc. v. Triangle Insulation & Sheet Metal Co., 302 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2002).  Some 
courts have erred by concluding otherwise in direct contravention of the statute.  See, e.g., 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only one form; 
UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”). 
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successful effort by courts to clean up the worst features of the 
statutory mayhem known as § 2-207.  As the judicially-massaged rules 
of § 2-207 came into sharper focus, it stands to reason that litigation 
would decrease. 
 In light of the tremendous expansion of the Internet’s commercial 
role, the relative quiet on the “battle of the forms” front might be 
explained by another reason.  Commercial parties have increasingly 
stopped exchanging forms as their mode of contracting or as their 
method for confirming an agreement; they choose instead to place and 
receive orders through web applications.  In this new environment, 
the battle of the forms may be irrelevant to commercial transactions.  
This article will assess the legal landscape for those commercial 
parties that have stopped fighting the battle of the forms. 
 In Section II, I argue that the battle of the forms between 
commercial parties may become a relic of the twentieth century.  First, 
I provide a very brief overview of the (relatively) settled law under  
§ 2-207.  I emphasize that the significant practical effect of § 2-207 is 
not only to permit commercial parties to erect a “force-field” to 
protect themselves from being subjected to unwanted terms on the 
other party’s form, but also to validate both parties’ forms to some 
extent, even when they are not effective, in themselves, to create 
contractual liability.  Next, I describe developments in web-based 
contracting and recent case law that applies contract formation 
principles to electronic contracting.  I conclude by suggesting that 
click-wrap agreements could eliminate the battle of the forms and 
thereby undermine § 2-207’s important role.  Finally, I describe why 
the efforts by parties to obtain the “force-field” protections of § 2-207 
in this new contracting environment are unlikely to succeed. 
 In Section III, I discuss the primary doctrinal alternatives 
available to address the contracting realities that commercial parties 
will face if the electronic age of contracting eliminates the battle of the 
forms.  First, I consider whether courts might use an 
unconscionability analysis to protect commercial parties from 
overreaching.  Although plausible in egregious cases, the practice of 
limiting the unconscionability doctrine to protecting consumers is so 
ingrained that a general application of the doctrine in the commercial 
setting is very unlikely.  Instead, I suggest that rehabilitating the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations can best address the problems 
created by electronic contracting.  This approach enjoys the benefit of 
being grounded in Karl Llewellyn’s theory of the validity of standard 
form contracts, and it is one of the important guiding principles of 
Article 2.  My approach to reasonable expectations will be sufficiently 
defined by the commercial context to permit consistent application by 
2008] MOOTZ 275 
 
 
 
 
 
those courts who are called upon to police the margins of acceptable 
contracting practices. 
 I conclude that the advent of paper standard form contracts posed 
problems for the law of contracts which § 2-207 has effectively 
addressed in a manner that promotes the reasonable expectations of 
the commercial parties involved.  As contracting practices move away 
from the battle of paper forms, and therefore outside the scope of § 2-
207, courts will need to protect commercial parties’ reasonable 
expectations more directly. 
II.  THE END OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
A.  THE (NEARLY) SETTLED LAW UNDER  
§ 2-207 FOR THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
 The commercial reality that motivated Karl Llewellyn to draft  
§ 2-207 is well known: businesses generally contract by reaching 
agreement only as to the key, material terms of a deal3; they then 
exchange form documents to show that they are closing the deal.4  
Although § 2-207 is universally derided for its incoherence, judicial 
decisions have created a relatively stable body of law that successfully 
abandons the common law “mirror image rule” by holding that the 
mere fact that parties exchange documents that differ from each other 
(even in material ways) does not prevent those documents from 
creating a contract if the parties have so intended.  Determining the 
terms of the resulting contract is a bit trickier, but courts generally 
have applied a “knockout” rule to terms that conflict,5 and they follow 
 
3 Generally, parties will agree expressly to a description of the goods, the price, and the 
delivery terms, although they need not reach even this degree of specificity in order to have 
an enforceable agreement under Article 2.  See U.C.C. § 2-204. 
4 A sales contract may be made “in any manner sufficient to show agreement.”  U.C.C. 
 § 2-204(1) (2000).  However, a sales contract “does not fail for indefiniteness” even 
though the parties have failed to show agreement on all the terms, so long as they have 
shown that they intend to be bound and have agreed to enough terms to permit a court to 
award a remedy for breach. Id. § 2-204(3). 
5 The courts have developed an approach to deal with conflicting terms in the forms used 
by parties to create the contract, analogizing to the “knockout” rule of U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 
(2000), regarding confirmatory memoranda.  See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 
F.2d 1569, 1578–80 (10th Cir. 1984) (describing the various interpretive approaches 
available to courts); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int’l. Inc., 830 A.2d 1279, 1285–87 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2003) (noting the strong support for the knockout rule and endorsing Daitom’s 
prediction regarding how Pennsylvania would construe § 2-207). 
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the rule of § 2-207(2) for terms that are additional to the terms on the 
other form.  Although there was a great deal of hermeneutical angst 
leading to the settled reading of the statute, the end result is relatively 
straightforward.  The parties’ forms can create a contract, despite the 
lack of symmetry that would demonstrate complete assent.  The terms 
of the resulting agreement include those terms as to which there is 
demonstrated assent, together with terms that could reasonably be 
expected to govern the relationship (consisting of immaterial 
additions on either party’s form, and the statutory gap-fillers). 
 Section 2-207, as originally drafted, did not comprehensively 
address the battle of the forms.  The drafters recognized that it would 
be stretching the idea of assent to conclude that a document could 
operate as an acceptance even though it “expressly” made acceptance 
“conditional on assent to the different or additional terms” in the 
form.6  In 1966, § 2-207 was amended by adding subsection (3) and 
 
6 U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2000).  Put simply, this provision permits a party to use a document to 
make a counter-offer in response to a document received from the other party, and is, 
therefore, unexceptional and necessary.  Formalist courts tend to enforce boilerplate 
declarations, in which the party sending the second form proclaims that its assent is 
“expressly conditioned” on the other party’s acceptance of its terms.  See, e.g., C. Itoh & 
Co., Inc. v. Jordan Int’l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235–36 (7th Cir. 1977) (boilerplate tracking 
the “expressly conditional” language of § 2-207 is effective to prevent assent).  However, 
even if the forms do not establish assent, the courts agree that § 2-207 does not permit the 
party sending the second form to obtain its terms; instead, recourse must be had to 
§ 2-207(3) in those cases where conduct makes clear the agreement of the parties.  Id. at 
1236.  The terms of the contract are those on which the forms of the parties agree, as well 
as all other terms imposed by Article 2.  Courts have construed these terms as including 
agreement by course of performance, course of dealing and trade usage, in addition to the 
gap-filler provisions. See Dresser Indus. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1451–52 (7th Cir. 
1992) (extending the rule announced in Itoh).  Subsection (3) thereby ensures the 
enforcement of the reasonable expectations of the parties when their conduct establishes 
that they have an agreement, despite the failure of their writings to do so. 
The better approach to the question of whether the second form constitutes a true counter-
offer is adopted by the court in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th 
Cir. 1972), in which the court held: 
[I]t is not enough that an acceptance is expressly conditional on 
additional or different terms; rather, an acceptance must be expressly 
conditional on the offeror's assent to those terms.  Viewing the 
Subsection (1) proviso within the context of the rest of that Subsection 
and within the policies of Section 2-207 itself, we believe that it was 
intended to apply only to an acceptance which clearly reveals that the 
offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured 
of the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms therein. 
Id.  This reading of § 2-207(1) attempts to distinguish boilerplate language that does not 
accurately reflect the unwillingness of the party to be bound from language in a form that 
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its related Official Comments.  Under this provision, conduct by both 
parties indicating the recognition of an agreement “is sufficient to 
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not 
otherwise establish a contract.”7  The provision then specifies the 
means for determining the terms of such an agreement.  As under § 2-
207(2), the terms of the agreement under § 2-207(3) are determined 
by the reasonable expectations of the parties, and include the “terms 
on which the writings of the parties agree,” together with any gap-
filling provisions.  Thus, the forms that are exchanged do not lose 
their significance even if they are insufficient on their face to close the 
deal.  However, by withholding assent in the form documents, the 
parties lose the opportunity for differing nonmaterial terms in their 
respective forms to become part of the agreement. 
 Although Karl Llewellyn clearly intended to overcome the “mirror 
image rule” and the “last shot rule” that dominated the unrealistic 
formalism of the classical common law model of contract, the practical 
benefit of § 2-207  provides commercial parties with an affirmative 
contracting strategy.  The section ensures that reasonable 
expectations are respected, even when the parties do not expressly 
agree on many terms of the deal.  Section 2-207 empowers 
commercial parties by allowing them to avoid undesirable terms by 
 
expressly states the party’s genuine and conscious refusal to proceed with a contract unless 
its terms are accepted.  The benefit of this approach is that it more closely tracks the 
reasonable expectations of the parties by enforcing more terms from their battling forms 
(not just terms in common, but also nonmaterial terms that do not appear in the other 
form).  This approach also acknowledges that the exchange by commercial parties of forms 
that both proclaim to withhold assent unless the other party agrees to all of the terms in 
the form is not worthy of judicial respect unless the party otherwise acts accordingly. 
7 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2000).  Comment 7 explains that in many cases, the conduct of the 
parties makes clear that there is a contract, so the only matter to be resolved is specifying 
the terms of their agreement.  The fact that the exchange of forms did not in itself create 
contractual liability is irrelevant to the formation question, since U.C.C. § 2-204(2) makes 
clear that it is unnecessary to identify a distinct offer and acceptance to specify the moment 
at which the parties became contractually bound.  The statute makes clear that “conduct by 
both parties” can show that a contract exists, and so this provision is not limited only to 
those cases in which the parties have performed their obligations, despite the absence of 
agreement.  See Lam Research Corp. v. Dallas Semiconductor Corp., Nos. H027073, 
H027366, H028003, 2006 WL 1000573 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2006) (seller had 
constructed two of the six tools); Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil & Servs. Co., Inc., 760 F.2d 
417 (2d Cir. 1985) (request by seller to extend delivery date and its buyer’s application to a 
bank for financing the purchase was conduct sufficient to show agreement).  Specifically, a 
court may consider conduct prior to the exchange of boilerplate documents that ostensibly 
withhold assent when determining whether an agreement exists.  See Axelson, Inc. v. 
McEvoy-Willis, 7 F.3d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1993); Nat’l Controls, Inc. v. Commodore Bus. 
Machines, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 688, 693–94 (1985). 
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creating a conflict with the other party’s form, resulting in the 
enforcement of gap-filling terms under the “knock-out” rule.  Forms 
operate like a commercial law “force-field” in that a party can screen 
out unwanted terms by raising its own form as a shield against the 
other party.  Thus, the party that does not want to arbitrate its 
disputes will put a choice of forum term in its form.   
 If the other party does not respond with a “force-field” form of its 
own, the choice of forum term will control.  If the other party does 
include a dispute resolution clause, the effects of the force-fields will 
neutralize each other and the gap filler provision will provide the 
enforceable dispute resolution term for the contract.  Under Article 2, 
the parties have an effective means to protect themselves against 
terms that deviate from the reasonably expected gap-filling baseline in 
material ways without having to worry that their non-mirroring forms 
will interfere with the formation of an enforceable contract.  This 
monumental conceptual advance in the law of contracts has served 
businesses well over the past forty years, despite the inelegant and 
opaque presentation of § 2-207 and the resulting tidal wave of 
litigation.8 
 There is no need to wade deeper into the complexities of § 2-207 
for the purpose of this article.  Too much ink by scholars (not to 
mention too much blood by litigators) has already been spilled in this 
endeavor.  The important point is that the courts, admittedly with 
some missteps and confusion, acceptably resolved the problem of the 
“battle of the forms” by respecting the reasonable expectations of the 
 
8 As one court famously summarized, there is wide recognition that § 2-207 is not a model 
of clarity and precision:  
In reviewing this determination by the District Court, we are aware of 
the problems which courts have had in interpreting Section 2-207.  This 
section of the UCC has been described as a “murky bit of prose,” Sw. 
Eng’g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 694, 473 P.2d 18, 25 
(1970), as “not too happily drafted,” Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & 
Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962), and as “one of the most 
important, subtle, and difficult in the entire Code, and well it may be 
said that the product as it finally reads is not altogether satisfactory.”  
DUESENBERG & KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE (Vol. 3, Bender's Uniform Commercial Code 
Service) § 3.03, at 3–12 (1969).  Despite the lack of clarity in its 
language, Section 2-207 manifests definite objectives which are 
significant in the present case.   
Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1165. 
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parties.9  Unfortunately, courts have finally resolved how best to 
implement § 2-207 just as its relevance to commercial contracting is 
waning. 
 B.  DEVELOPMENTS IN WEB-BASED CONTRACTING  
AND THE EMERGING LEGAL REGIME 
 When a commercial party submits an order on a supplier’s 
website, there would appear to be no battle of the forms, thus 
rendering § 2-207 irrelevant to the transaction.  Manufacturers are 
developing increasingly sophisticated inventory control, production 
management, and supply-chain integration, all of which require 
computerized order management.  Naturally, this leads sellers to 
encourage online transactions through web applications because this 
method eliminates the need for any data to be input by the seller.10  
The same dynamic holds true for many buyers as well: a large 
manufacturer benefits if it purchases raw materials and component 
parts by means of highly sophisticated software that invites approved 
sellers to make offers on the buyer’s website, subject to the buyer’s 
terms and conditions.   
 Web-based contracting enables the buyer to integrate its 
purchasing needs with nearly simultaneous offers from designated 
sellers.  The fact that this contracting process also allows the buyer to 
obtain its posted terms while avoiding the battle of the forms may just 
 
9 The accumulated wisdom of decades of litigation generally has been gathered in Amended 
Article 2 (2003), proposed by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) [formerly known as 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)], but 
Amended Article 2 has been ignored by the states.  Amended § 2-207 wisely separates 
contract formation principles from § 2-207 and adds them to Amended § 2-206, and it 
makes clear that the “knockout” rule applies generally.  Unfortunately, Amended § 2-207 
dodges the all-important question of “shrink-wrap” terms (see Amended Cmt. 5) and also 
eliminates the sensible rule that additional terms in one form can enter the agreement if 
they do not materially alter the agreement and the other party has not effectively protested 
(either prospectively or after receiving the form with the additional term). 
10 A personal (consumer) experience confirms how important these web applications may 
be for contemporary businesses.  I recently ordered a deluxe fruit basket for a relative over 
the Internet, but, as soon as I completed the order, I realized that I had made a mistake 
with regard to the delivery date.  I immediately e-mailed and telephoned customer service, 
advising them of the mistake.  The customer service representative assured me that I would 
not be charged for my original (incorrect) order, but also said that the company had no 
effective means of canceling the order, even though the scheduled delivery date was nearly 
two weeks away.  Rather than interrupt the computerized fulfillment of the order, it made 
more sense for the company to absorb the loss.  So, my relative received two deluxe fruit 
baskets for the price of one (and I received two thank-you notes). 
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be a collateral benefit to the business advantages of contracting in this 
manner.  The advantages of computerized contracting are magnified 
in many industries where large parties both purchase from, and sell 
to, other commercial parties. 
 As companies further transition to web-based inventory control 
and ordering, we will see fewer battles involving forms.  Although it 
might appear that avoiding the dreaded “battle of the forms” promises 
to restore clarity and certainty to contract law, the resulting regime’s 
prevailing doctrine may need some adjustments before it proves to be 
acceptable to, and appropriate for, commercial parties.  In this 
Section, I first provide a brief historical overview of the legal analysis 
of this emerging contracting reality before discussing desirable 
changes in the application of contract law doctrines. 
 An initial step toward Internet contracting was the so-called 
“shrink-wrap” cases where sellers concluded deals with respect to the 
dickered terms and then delivered the goods to the buyer with 
voluminous standard terms included inside the box.  Without the 
typical order-acknowledgement contracting, these cases generated a 
great deal of controversy and uncertainty in the law.11  This scenario 
 
11 “Shrink-wrap” contracts posed difficulties for courts because the time of contracting, 
ostensibly irrelevant under § 2-204(2), was subject to dispute and interpretation; here it 
became vitally important in deciding whether the agreement included the terms contained 
inside the (sometimes metaphorical) shrink-wrap.  See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that the results in the cases turn, at least in 
part, on “whether the court finds that the parties formed their contract before or after the 
vendor communicated its terms to the purchaser”).  In my Sales casebook, I have 
characterized this mode of contracting as moving from the “battle of the forms” to the 
“attack of a single form.”  See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ III, DAVID FRISCH & PETER A. ALCES, 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SALES, LEASES, AND COMPUTER INFORMATION 135 (LexisNexis 
2004).  Case law includes vigorous debate as to whether these scenarios implicate § 2-207.  
Some courts have famously held that the parties had concluded their contracting before the 
shrink-wrap terms were introduced, and, therefore, the terms must be assessed as 
“additional” terms under § 2-207. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 
(3d Cir. 1991) (holding that an in-box license must be analyzed as additional terms under 
§ 2-207, and finding that the shrink-wrap terms were not a counteroffer accepted by the 
buyer but instead were additional terms that entered the agreement only if they were not 
material); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1998); Ariz. Retail 
Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. 
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006); Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 114 P.3d 487 (Okla. 
App. 2005); and Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2001).  Other 
courts have concluded that the agreement was not formed until the terms in the box arrive; 
therefore, the shrink-wrap terms become part of the contract through the recipient’s 
manifestation of assent by keeping the goods.  See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. 
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).  For a 
particularly detailed critique of “terms later” contracting as recognized in ProCD and Hill, 
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quickly moved beyond the literal case of documents located within a 
shrink-wrapped box to situations in which an order was placed (by 
telephone or on a website) and the terms were made available to the 
customer at a later point, leading commentators to characterize this 
method of forming the contract as ongoing or “rolling.”12  Courts were 
divided about how to assess this new contracting environment.  While 
most courts were wary of adding terms to the deal in the absence of 
manifest consumer assent, some courts began with the presumption 
that the requirements of the modern economy made it necessary for 
the law to move in precisely this direction.  Fortunately, in the era of 
web-based ordering, there simply is no need for sellers to use “terms 
later” contracting that is subject to the inconsistent judicial treatment 
of so-called “shrink-wrap” terms; the playing field has moved to a 
more seller-friendly Internet venue. 
 A commercial buyer is likely to find Internet ordering every bit as 
convenient as the millions of consumers who order from Amazon.com 
and other online companies.13  When a buyer submits an order on the 
seller’s website, the seller is able to present its standard terms and 
conditions (in the form of a hyperlink, or inside a text box that 
contains the terms which may be read with a scroll bar) to the buyer 
as part of the initial contract formation, rather than after the sale in 
 
see Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad 
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. POL’Y 641 (2004). 
12 See generally Steven E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 
4–7 (2006) (characterizing “rolling contracts” as those in which at least some of the terms 
are presented later, including, but not limited, to the classic shrink-wrap situation).  For 
example, in Williams v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 00-0962, 2001 WL 135825 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 8, 2001), a group of consumers brought a class action, complaining that damaging 
configurations to their computers occurred during the downloading process and before the 
terms of service were made available for the consumer to read and then click “I agree.”  
This case is probably best viewed as a “shrink-wrap,” terms-to-follow case, despite the fact 
that the product in some cases was downloaded from the Internet.  The court noted that 
the damage occurred before the terms were presented, and even then the consumer was 
forced to change the default selection and click an alternate icon twice to get to the screen 
that displayed the terms of service, which could, of course, be rejected only after the alleged 
damage had occurred. 
13 I could not locate data regarding the prevalence of online ordering by commercial 
parties, but the volume of retail e-commerce is probably a useful proxy for the growing 
importance of such ordering.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau of the Department of 
Commerce, the U.S. retail e-commerce sales estimate for the third quarter of 2007 is $36.2 
billion. Although this represents only 3.5% of all retail sales, there is continuing strong 
growth in e-commerce every quarter.  See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Quarterly E-Commerce Sales, 4th Quarter 2007 (Feb. 15, 2008), 
http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html/07Q4.html. 
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the form of documents included with the goods.  It was immediately 
apparent to courts that this situation was different from the scenario 
presented in the shrink-wrap cases.  Courts began characterizing 
transactions as “browse-wrap” agreements when the terms were 
referenced on the website accessed by the buyer, and as “click-wrap” 
agreements when the buyer was required to “accept” the terms 
actively by clicking an “I agree” icon.14 
 A number of courts refused to enforce terms that were offered in 
browse-wrap fashion on the grounds that the parties had not agreed to 
them because the terms were not sufficiently highlighted by the 
offering party.15  As one court explained, browse-wrap terms will not 
enter the agreement if the party had visited a website only sporadically 
and, therefore, was unaware of the terms and conditions that were 
available, but not immediately presented, on the website.  However, if 
the evidence shows that the party had notice of the terms and 
conditions referenced on the site, then that party will be bound by the 
posted terms.16  The analysis in these cases focused on the 
 
 
14 Two commentators recently noted that this nomenclature does not correspond to 
natural, fixed categories because some commercial situations will exhibit characteristics of 
both scenarios.  See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of 
Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2005–2006, 62 BUS. LAW. 195, 201–03 (2006) 
(discussing the irrelevance of the click-wrap/browse-wrap distinction as exhibited in 
Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)).  See also Juliet 
Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307 (2005) 
(arguing that courts should assess cases in terms of the signaling function of the 
communication methodology to reference the terms, rather than attempting to define 
different categories of cases). 
15 The classic case is Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).  The 
court concluded 1) that the persons seeking to download the SmartDownload program 
would have no reason to scroll down the web page to find the link to the terms and 
conditions, 2) that the link went to a generic page with a number of different license terms 
for various products, and 3) that there was no “I agree” button that signaled the existence 
of the terms and conditions.  The court concluded: “We disagree with the proposition that a 
reasonably prudent offeree in plaintiffs’ position would necessarily have known or learned 
of the existence of the SmartDownload license agreement prior to acting, so that plaintiffs 
may be held to have assented to that agreement with constructive notice of its terms.”  Id. 
at 30.  The court noted that UCITA “generally recognizes the importance of conspicuous 
notice and unambiguous manifestation of assent in online sales and licensing of computer 
information,” showing that this effort by NCCUSL may be influential despite its failure as a 
uniform law project.  Id. at 34. 
16 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401–02 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the 
ordinary contract principles at work by analogizing to a roadside fruit stand with a bushel 
of apples and a sign that indicates they are for sale for 50 cents each).  The court 
specifically rejected the suggestion by other courts that clicking an “I agree” button was a 
necessary element of showing one’s assent to the posted terms, concluding: 
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conspicuous character of the posted terms of use, viewed in light of 
the parties’ contracting history, the nature of the interactions between 
the party to be bound, and the website in question.  In general, if a 
commercial party with some measure of sophistication sought to 
avoid a reasonable term of use by claiming ignorance of the terms, 
despite repeated visits to the website, courts have been reluctant to 
permit that commercial party to avoid liability.17 
 
[W]e are not inclined to agree with the Ticketmaster court’s analysis.  
There is a crucial difference between the circumstances of Specht, 
where we declined to enforce Netscape’s specified terms against a user 
of its software because of inadequate evidence that the user had seen 
the terms when downloading the software, and those of Ticketmaster, 
where the taker of information from Ticketmaster’s site knew full well 
the terms on which the information was offered but was not offered an 
icon marked, “I agree,” on which to click.  Under the circumstances of 
Ticketmaster, we see no reason why the enforceability of the offeror’s 
terms should depend on whether the taker states (or clicks), “I agree.” 
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the 
offeree to click on an “I agree” icon.  And no doubt, in many 
circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essential 
to the formation of a contract.  But not in all circumstances.  While new 
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it 
has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.  It is standard 
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated 
conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with 
knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an 
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the 
offeree. . . . 
As we see it, the defendant in Ticketmaster and Verio in this case had a 
similar choice.  Each was offered access to information subject to terms 
of which they were well aware.  Their choice was either to accept the 
offer of contract, taking the information subject to the terms of the 
offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the 
benefits. 
Id. at 403 (criticizing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654, 2000 WL 
1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)) (citations omitted).  
17 See Register.com, 356 F.3d at 396–97 (upholding the browse-wrap agreement on the 
terms of use and noting that Verio devised an automated software program, or robot, to 
acquire information from Register.com’s site and then attempted to use that information 
for its own commercial benefit in a manner that “was inconsistent with the terms of the 
restrictive legend Register attached to its responses to Verio's queries”); Pollstar v. 
Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to dismiss the 
complaint for breach of contract against Gigmania, which downloaded up-to-date 
information on concerts from Pollstar’s site and then posted this information on its own 
site). 
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 In the fact-specific and uncertain legal environment surrounding 
browse-wrap agreements, sellers quickly adapted by introducing click-
wrap formats on their websites that both made clear the terms and 
conditions that governed the transaction, and made these terms 
immediately available to the party in a scrolling text box or via 
hyperlink.18  Pure click-wrap contracts have received very favorable 
treatment by the courts under standard contract analysis.  Courts have 
readily concluded that clicking an “I agree” icon next to an electronic 
presentation of the seller’s terms forms a contract and manifests the 
purchaser’s assent to those terms.19  Click-wrap cases are easy cases 
 
Even in the consumer setting courts have enforced browse-wrap agreements in 
circumstances where the party had more than cursory notice of the terms.  See, e.g. Fiser v. 
Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 334 (N.M. App. 2007) (holding that Fiser was bound 
by terms that were available not only by a hyperlink during the ordering process, but also 
were included with the delivery of the computer when Fiser still had the ability to cancel 
the transaction). 
18 The move to click-wrap contracting was a predictable response to the Specht case.  For 
example, in the aftermath of the District Court opinion in Specht, attorney David Scranton 
suggested that his fellow banking lawyers ought to be advising their clients using website 
interfaces to transition immediately to click-wrap contracting to ensure enforceability. 
Even if other courts decide otherwise, this decision appears clear 
enough that banks and other financial institutions should be promptly 
reevaluating their Web sites to be sure that any terms, conditions or 
agreements that are intended to be binding upon a visitor are 
implemented with a “click-through” type mechanism to verify that the 
visitor is aware of them and agrees to them. . . . 
. . .   
Thus, although the matter may not be finally resolved in many 
jurisdictions, it clearly appears to be a unanimous trend of decisions to 
uphold click-wrap agreements if they sufficiently give notice of an 
agreement’s terms to a Web site visitor and require the visitor to 
affirmatively indicate agreement by clicking a button, but to deny 
enforceability to browsewrap or other agreements that require 
something less of a visitor. 
David F. Scranton, “Clickwrap” or “Browsewrap”: Enforceable Website Agreements, 119 
BANKING L.J. 290, 291, 295 (2002).  This advice has only been reinforced by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the  Second Circuit’s decision affirming Specht and other case 
law on these points.  
19 One commentator recently concluded, “[b]ecause the user has ‘signed’ the contract by 
clicking ‘I agree,’ every court to consider the issue has held clickwrap licenses enforceable.”  
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (citing relevant cases in 
note 20).  Representative cases include: Specht, 306 F.3d at 22 (finding that the parties 
“expressly agreed to Communicator’s license terms by clicking ‘Yes’”); Forrest v. Verizon 
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because there is no ambiguity regarding the time of formation, as 
there is in shrink-wrap cases; here, the terms are present when the 
buyer manifests assent.  Consequently, most courts find § 2-207 
 
Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002) (consumers had notice and 
opportunity to read the forum selection clause before clicking “I agree”); RealPage, Inc. v. 
EPS, Inc., No. 4:06-CV-251, 2007 WL 2572255 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 5, 2007) (holding that 
click-wrap terms are enforceable even if the party was not required to scroll through the 
entire agreement before clicking “I accept,” but finding that the terms in question were too 
indefinite to enforce); Doe v. Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio, 2007); 
Hauenstein v. Softwrap Ltd., No. C07-0572MJP, 2007 WL 2404624 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 17, 
2007); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 238 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“By clicking on 
the ‘Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions’ button, Plaintiff indicated assent to the 
terms . . . Plaintiff’s failure to read the Agreement, if that were the case, does not excuse 
him from being bound by his express agreement.”); FTC v. Cleverlink Trading Ltd., No. 05 
C 2889, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82264 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2006) (finding that clicking an 
“Accept” box is analytically indistinguishable from traditional ways of showing assent, and 
that there “is no dispute that Cleverlink [buyer] applied for Oceanic’s [seller] services over 
the Internet and accepted the terms of the Agreement by clicking the “Accept” box”); 
Eslworldwide.com, Inc. v. Interland, Inc., No. 06 CV 2503(LBS), 2006 WL 1716881 
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006) (forum selection clause enforceable although contained in the 
terms of service agreement that the plaintiff allegedly inadvertently clicked when visiting 
the site to update its credit card information on file); Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of 
the U. S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039–40 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding that clicking the 
icon is a manifestation of assent to the terms offered); i-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., 
No. Civ. 02-1951 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742082, *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004) (click-through 
process for loading 2001 software formed a contract); Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291 
F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1162–63 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that clicking the “I agree” icon 
evidenced express agreement to the offeror’s terms); DeJohn v. TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp. 
2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Although it is true that the terms of the contract were 
dictated solely by Register.com, DeJohn expressly indicated that he read, understood, and 
agreed to those terms when he clicked on the box on Register.com’s website.”); Hughes v. 
McMenamon, 204 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002) (forum selection clause in click-
wrap agreement is enforceable); iLan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 
2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding explicit acceptance of terms by clicking on “I agree”); 
In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill., May 8, 
2000); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
(finding that consumers had notice and opportunity to read the forum selection clause 
before clicking “I agree”); and Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. 
App. 1999) (“Plaintiffs must be taken to have known that they were entering into a contract 
[by clicking “I agree”], and no good purpose, consonant with the dictates of reasonable 
reliability in commerce, would be served by permitting them to disavow particular 
provisions or the contracts as a whole.”). 
In this article I assume that for all practical purposes, the battle regarding assent is over—
perhaps with good cause in light of Karl Llewellyn’s theory of blanket assent, see text and 
accompanying notes 74–82 infra—and that the issue facing courts is how to determine the 
governing terms of the agreement.  Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that genuine assent is 
anything but clear-cut in these cases. 
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wholly irrelevant to the legal analysis, just as if the parties had signed 
a single paper document memorializing their agreement.20 
 Although the situation is not quite as clear-cut, courts reach the 
same result for software that requires the licensee to click-through 
several “I agree” icons in order to install the program.  In these 
situations, courts find either (1) that the agreement was not finalized 
until the click-wrap stage during installation (the “rolling contract” 
analysis), (2) that the click-wrap agreement during the installation 
represents the buyer’s acceptance of the seller’s counteroffer, or (3) 
that the click-wrap agreement is a modification of a pre-existing 
agreement that led to the shipment of the product.  The rules of  
§ 2-207 are implicated only under the counteroffer analysis, and then 
only to establish that the counteroffer was accepted by the licensee; 
therefore, there is no traditional battle of the forms.21 
 
20 Salco Distribs. v. Icode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-642-T-27TGW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9483 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2006).  The Salco Court held that by signing a purchase order that 
referenced an End User License and Servicing Agreement, opening the envelope containing 
the software that contained a similar legend and then clicking several “I accept” icons in 
the course of installing the software, the licensee was bound by the licensor’s forum 
selection clause.  The court followed the seemingly unanimous approach of courts that 
specifically reject the application of § 2-207 in such cases, concluding that § 2-207  
[A]ddresses the terms of a contract “when the parties’s [sic] conduct 
establishes a contract, but the parties have failed to adopt expressly a 
particular writing as the terms of their agreement, and the writings 
exchanged by the parties do not agree. . . .”  Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech. 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991).  Here, Plaintiff and 
Defendant expressly adopted a particular writing as their Agreement.  
As noted in ProCD, Inc., [v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)], 
this is not “a battle-of-the forms case, in which the parties exchange 
incompatible forms and a court must decide which prevails.” ProCD, 
Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. . . . 
. . . 
Plaintiff expressly accepted the terms of the Agreement by opening, 
installing and registering the software and clicking “I accept.”  Its terms 
are therefore enforceable. 
Id. at *11–14; see also  Siebert, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–40; Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet 
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004); Koresko, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–63. 
21 iLan Sys., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (discussing the various ways in which the 
agreement could be construed, but finding that even under § 2-207 the parties ultimately 
agreed on additional terms by virtue of the click-wrap agreement embedded in the disks). 
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 Finally, there may be an intermediate shift in practices that also 
would render the battle of the forms irrelevant.  We might add to the 
developed lexicon by recognizing an additional category of cases that 
can be termed “sign-wrap” contracts.  These cases present a variation 
on the doctrine of incorporation by reference.  The sign-wrap situation 
occurs when parties execute a written agreement that includes a 
notice that the terms of the agreement include standard terms that are 
posted at a designated URL.  Although the parties are dealing with a 
paper contract, the referenced “standard terms and conditions” reside 
only in cyberspace.22  Unlike the traditional form contract that 
presented the standard terms and conditions on the reverse side of the 
document, the sign-wrap approach permits a party to obtain a 
signature on a form that contains the agreed material terms and a 
reference to a URL that purports to incorporate those standard terms 
into the agreement, despite the other party’s potential ignorance of 
their existence.   
 Compared to the browse-wrap scenario, there is a more specific 
manifestation of assent because the party signs the form that includes 
the URL reference.  However, compared to the click-wrap scenario, 
there is less explicit consent to the terms in question because there is 
no specific assent to terms that are immediately available before 
signing.  It would appear that the intermediate strategy of sign-wrap 
contracts will generate litigation and uncertainty.23 Thus, it is likely 
that this approach will be phased out in favor of a web-based “click-
wrap” approach, to the extent possible. 
 
 
22 Compare Hugger-Mugger, L.L.C. v. NetSuite, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-592 TC, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33003, at *15 (D. Utah Sept. 12, 2005) (finding that the terms were incorporated by 
reference), with Affinity Internet, Inc. v. Consol. Credit Counseling Servs., 920 So. 2d 1286, 
1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the mere reference to the website was 
insufficient to incorporate the terms).  These cases are analyzed in Moringiello & Reynolds, 
supra note 14, at 199–200.  But cf. Conference Am., Inc. v. Conexant Sys., Inc., 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 1005 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (finding that a letter referencing terms at a URL 
successfully incorporated the posted terms under unilateral contract analysis).  
23 One significant problem might arise in determining the terms that were posted at the 
URL at the time of contracting.  Assuming that the party continually adjusts its terms, it 
would stretch even a formalist approach to contract doctrine to conclude that the other 
party had consented to permit the terms of the agreement to be modified at will simply by 
changing the terms posted at the designated URL.  If a party expressly attempts to subject 
the other party to terms that may be changed at will, it seems difficult to understand how 
the test of an “intent to be bound” would be met.  Even if the contract is interpreted in this 
manner, there would be a significant question of the bounds of a good faith exercise of this 
right that would render the terms less predictable.  A simple solution for sellers is to 
change the URL with each iteration, perhaps by adding a code for the date of the update to 
the link, but this would lead to a multitude of different contract forms that would 
undermine the purpose of having a standard form agreement in the first place. 
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 The case law struggling with the contract analysis of shrink-wrap, 
browse-wrap, sign-wrap and click-wrap agreements, has developed 
largely as a result of litigation involving computer information 
transactions.  Although computer information transactions are not 
expressly included within the scope of Article 2, courts often apply 
Article 2 by analogy or by reading the scope provision broadly.24  It 
 
24 This is a huge and contentious issue.  Article 2 applies to “transactions in goods,” U.C.C. 
§ 2-102 (2000), with goods being defined as “all things . . . movable at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale.”  U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000).  Computer information is 
licensed rather than sold, and it is more in the nature of intellectual property than a good.  
A license can be considered a “transaction,” but it remains difficult to consider the 
licensing of intellectual property to be a “good.”  Moreover, the definition of “contract” and 
“agreement” provide that they are “limited to those relating to the present or future sale of 
goods.”  Id. § 2-106(1), and most of the provisions in Article 2 refer expressly to buyers and 
sellers.  Nevertheless, many courts find that Article 2 provides appropriate rules governing 
contract formation for these transactions.  The court in iLan characterizes this approach in 
an honest manner: 
In Massachusetts and across most of the nation, software licenses exist 
in a legislative void.  Legal scholars, among them the Uniform 
Commissioners on State Laws, have tried to fill that void, but their 
efforts have not kept pace with the world of business. . . . So far only 
Maryland and Virginia have adopted UCITA; Massachusetts has not.  
Accordingly, the Court will not spend its time considering UCITA.  At 
the same time, the Court will not overlook Article 2 simply because its 
provisions are imperfect in today’s world.  Software licenses are entered 
into every day, and business persons reasonably expect that some law 
will govern them.  For the time being, Article 2’s familiar provisions—
which are the inspiration for UCITA—better fulfill those expectations 
than would the common law.  Article 2 technically does not, and 
certainly will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for the 
time being the Court will assume it does.   
iLan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (footnote omitted).  There is a confusing array of cases on this 
topic, including a recent case in which the court concluded that an agreement to develop 
software from scratch is not within the scope of Article 2 because it is more in the nature of 
a service contract, ignoring the fact that agreements to develop custom-designed and 
specially manufactured goods are contracts within the scope of Article 2 pursuant to the 
definition of “goods” in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000).  See Syss. Am., Inc. v. Rockwell Software, 
Inc., No. C 03-02232 JF (RS), 2007 WL 218242, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26,  2007) 
(unpublished slip opinion).   
Courts rarely note the truly Llewellynesque character of Article 2’s scope provisions, which 
are qualified with the caveat, “unless the context otherwise requires.”  See U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 
and 2-106(1) (2000).  Consequently, Article 2 literally extends to all transactions to which 
it makes sense to apply Article 2, thereby granting to courts the express statutory 
justification for picking and choosing when Article 2 makes sense for a particular case 
involving computer information.  This is a bit radical, I suspect, for virtually any court to 
embrace, but there you have it in black and white. 
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stands to reason that this developing line of precedent from the 
computer information arena will be applied to transactions in 
traditional goods as producers and purchasers embrace the Internet 
era of electronic contracting.25 If so, commercial parties will have 
every reason to respond to this evolving legal landscape by using click-
wrap agreements to secure all of their desired terms in contracts 
involving the sale of goods. 
 The problem with this development in contracting practices is that 
there is every reason to believe that a formalist endorsement of click-
wrap agreements will not capture the parties’ “bargain in fact” in some 
cases.  Writing about consumer transactions, scholars have argued 
that transactions conducted over the Internet are qualitatively 
different in certain respects from the use of paper standardized 
 
A recent scholarly exchange between Professors Nimmer and Braucher about whether 
Article 2 should govern information transactions suggests that the radioactive fallout from 
the failed UCITA and Article 2 drafting projects has a durable half-life and that this issue 
will continue to foster a vigorous scholarly debate.  Compare Raymond T. Nimmer, An 
Essay on Article 2's Irrelevance to Licensing Agreements, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 235 
(2006), with Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A 
Strategy that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 261 (2006). 
25 My general approach to this problem is suggested in a recent article regarding the details 
of computer information contracting.  See Lemley, supra note 7 (analyzing the use of click-
wrap and browse-wrap licensing of computer information on websites).  I agree with 
Lemley that the most significant implication of this development may be the effect on 
commercial parties that are unable to invoke various consumer protections statutes, 
regulations and judicial decisions, id. at 462, and that we need something akin to the 
“battle of the forms” solution to the rise of form paper contracts in the previous century.  
Id. at 464.  Lemley’s primary concern rests with the increasing enforceability of browse-
wrap terms against commercial parties that regularly and repeatedly visit websites to 
obtain computer information, particularly through the use of robots.  Id. at 478 (arguing 
that enforcing browse-wrap contract between commercial parties by assuming that 
repeated visits to a site constitutes knowledge of the offered terms “may prove 
unworkable”).  Professor Lemley concludes that we need a substitute for § 2-207 in the 
browse-wrap cases involving the use of web applications and the licensing of computer 
information, suggesting that perhaps courts ought not enforce terms of use that materially 
change the deal.  Id. at 482.  I am arguing for a more general re-orientation of the law to 
deal with click-wrap commercial transactions that might result in unfair surprise or 
hardship to a party that finds itself bound to all of the other party’s terms in the course of 
contracting for the purchase or sale of goods. 
Michael Madison provides an insightful assessment of the enforceability of terms of use 
according to the property metaphor of “rights of access” and the contract metaphor of 
“agreement” in a manner that helps to illuminate some of the general issues that also 
pertain to the question of the enforceability of contract terms.  See Michael J. Madison, 
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2003). 
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forms.26  There is no reason to draw a sharp distinction between 
consumers and commercial parties in this respect.  As Jean Braucher 
 
26 Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization, Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of 
the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 69 (2006): 
Contract scholars have been more or less obsessed with the non-
dickered, adhesive nature of standardized form contracts for much of 
the last century.  The modern reality of highly sophisticated forms of 
adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts—appears to 
exacerbate the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer 
adhesion contracts.   
Id. at 71. 
The Internet-based consumer contract appears to stretch the volitional nature of contract 
past the breaking point through the use of browse-wrap and click-wrap terms, and to 
deprive e-consumers of all bargaining power, except the naked ability to walk away from 
the deal.  As Professor Radin has observed, consumer assent to Internet-based adhesion 
contracts is even more fictional than with the traditional paper versions.  And, as 
marketing models grow more sophisticated and intrusive [including data mining to 
manipulate consumer choices], they threaten even that tenuous grasp on control.  Id. at 81 
(citing Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1155–60 (2000)).  See also, Moringiello, supra note 14, at 1309–10, 1319 (arguing 
that courts should not apply contract formation rules from the world of paper contracts 
without assessing the differences in the signaling function of electronic modes of 
contracting, including the fact that in the electronic environment (at least in its early 
stages) many consumers may not even understand that there are detailed boilerplate terms 
to which they are agreeing). 
Jay Feinman has argued that this solicitude for form agreements presented electronically is 
part of a broader “unmaking” of modern contract law and a return to classical approaches 
to formation.  Jay M. Feinman, Un-making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common 
Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2004).  Charles Knapp recently expressed his 
concerns about the revival of a formalistic approach to electronic contracting in a brief 
footnote response to Randy Barnett’s thesis that clicking “I agree” manifests one’s consent 
to be bound: 
But typically the signing of a written agreement, even if accompanied by 
a series of “initialings” as well, is a one-time action, with substantial 
“cautionary” as well as “channeling” aspects.  (Recall the well-worn 
phrase: “Sign on the dotted line.”) . . . In contrast, on-line transactions 
typically involve a whole series of clickings and typings to get from start 
to finish; whether any particular one of those has the kind of symbolic 
significance equal to the signing of one’s name on a document seems to 
me to be extremely dubious. 
Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of 
Individual Contracts, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 95, 113 n.71 (2006) (criticizing Randy 
Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 635 (2002)). 
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Professors Hillman and Rachlinski reach the apparently different conclusion that existing 
contract law is “up to the challenge” of the electronic age “because the basic structure and 
underlying economics of the standard-form transaction are consistent in both the paper 
and electronic worlds.”  Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form 
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 434, 495 (2002).  However, they 
also endorse Llewellyn’s notion of “blanket assent” that is policed by courts on a case-by-
case basis, concluding that “courts must continue to be concerned that consumers 
unwittingly will enter into standard-form agreements that are primarily exploitative rather 
than mutually beneficial.”  Id. at 485.  Thus, they appear to reject an overly formalist 
approach to assent in electronic forms. 
This discussion often is held in the shadow of economic theorizing about efficient markets 
and the costs of paternalistic interventions, but more recent behavioral research explains 
how adhesion contracts in the consumer setting can be inefficient and oppressive despite 
the claims of law and economics scholars.  See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2003) 
(arguing that research establishes that “the fundamental cause of inefficient terms in form 
contracts lies in the boundedly rational approaches buyers use to evaluate information and 
make choices in the marketplace,” and suggesting that the doctrine of unconscionability be 
revised and applied in light of this source of inefficiency); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–48 (1995) 
(contract doctrines relating to standard form agreements are best understood as a response 
to bounded rationality rather than an effort to police the exploitation of one party by 
another).  Robert Prentice has argued in detail that the “Chicago Man” of law and 
economics, assumed to be unboundedly rational, has been shown by extensive research to 
be implausible; thus, he has been replaced by “K-T Man” of behavioral economics, 
assumed to be subject to heuristics and cognitive biases.  Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, 
K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663 
(2003) (critiquing Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The 
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1907 (2002), and Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should 
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 
(2002)).  Prentice provides a powerful argument in favor of a cautious and pragmatic 
adoption of the lessons of behavioral decision theory. 
Policy prescriptions based on complicated but very real facts have more 
promise than those based on elegant but very wrong theory. . . . The 
policy prescriptions offered by legal decision theorists will never be 
incontestable.  They will seldom be simple.  However, for K-T Man to 
have more descriptive, explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive power 
than Chicago Man, people need only be systematically (not universally 
and uniformly) subject to the various heuristics and biases discussed in 
the literature.  And they are. . . .   
Despite the limitations of social science research . . .  the debate over 
whether the economists’ Chicago Man or the psychologists’ K-T Man 
better describes reality is over; the psychologists won.   
Prentice, supra note 24, at 1771, 1774.  
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notes, protective legislation and common-law doctrines “are explicitly 
or in practice restricted to consumer contracts, . . . [b]ut line-drawing 
is commonly highly underinclusive and perhaps occasionally 
overinclusive.”27  Although Braucher argues against creating a new 
“small business” category for analysis, she does suggest that courts 
consider the context of the transaction more carefully.28  Larry Garvin 
has detailed how the sharp consumer-commercial distinction in 
contract law fails to match reality,29 but he too urges that we not 
compound the error by simply creating an intermediate category of 
 
It would be a mistake to adopt specific legal rules based on a supposed truth about how 
parties deviate from rational behavior, but it seems plain enough that we have confirmed 
experimentally what people have known intuitively since the emergence of literature, 
religion and philosophy: people never act in a wholly rational manner that can provide a 
steady backdrop for the adoption of specific legal rules. 
27 Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons 
for Standard Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 
396–97 (2003). 
28 Braucher reasons: 
A business may be small but make a large, negotiated contract in which 
all terms are carefully considered after investigation of available 
alternatives.  On the other hand, a large business may make a relatively 
small transaction in which it would not make economic sense to 
negotiate or even shop over terms, especially complex ones. 
Id. at 397. 
29 Garvin argues that small businesses are regularly placed on the “commercial” side of 
contract law’s bifurcated system of rules, although in many situations they more closely 
resemble consumers.   
“In many ways, small business most resemble consumers and non-
merchants in their abilities to deal with risk, whether financially or 
cognitively, to secure and process information, and to fend for 
themselves in the market.  Nevertheless, they are generally—almost 
invariably—treated like merchants.  Small businesses thus get the worst 
of each dichotomy.  In their dealings with consumers, small businesses 
must give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist.  In 
their dealings with larger businesses, small businesses are treated as 
though the parties are essentially equal, which will not usually be true 
save in the most formal sense.”  
Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 297 (2005).  
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“small business.”30  At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that the 
loss of the force-field protections of §2-207 by commercial parties 
might lead to unacceptable results on the fringes for business entities 
that find themselves subject to surprising and unreasonable click-
wrap terms, but in response to which they are unable to utilize 
consumer protection statutes and 
C.  STRATEGIES FOR RECLAIMING THE  
FORCE-FIELD PROTECTION OF § 2-207 
 Article 2 effectively solved the problem of standard form contracts 
by permitting commercial parties to wage battles with their forms and 
thereby achieve the “force-field” protection of § 2-207.  In contrast, 
consumers do not use forms in contracting.  Consequently, a large 
body of consumer-oriented law developed in statutory, regulatory, and 
common law forms to ensure the integrity of consumer contracting.  
However, commercial parties that no longer exchange forms in the 
course of contracting may find themselves in a strange new world in 
which they no longer have  “force-field” protection, nor are they able 
to avail themselves of consumer protection law.  The question then 
becomes whether a commercial party might recover the benefits of 
§ 2-207 in this new, post-battle of the forms contracting environment. 
 Commercial parties might regain the benefits of § 2-207 in several 
ways.  First, a party confronted with a sign-wrap form could, relatively 
easily, include a handwritten notation at the time that it signs the 
document stating that its “assent is withheld unless the seller assents 
to the terms and conditions located at http://www.goodspurchaser. 
com/terms.html.”  This strategy would simply transfer the battle of 
the forms to the battle of the URLs within a single form; in these 
circumstances, courts might preserve the force-field protection of  
§ 2-207 for the parties.  Of course, if the seller responded to such a 
strategy by insisting that the offending addition be stricken and that 
the other party agree to all of its terms and conditions, this would 
 
30 The vast diversity in small businesses creates a “messy” reality, “and suggests that a one-
size-fits-all approach to treating small business in contract and commercial law will fail.”  
Id. at 370.  Recent research suggests that the simplifying nomothetic assumption that all 
consumers share the same cognitive deficits is misleading.  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive 
Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006).  This does 
not undermine the claim that behavioral decision theory is an improvement over the 
assumed rational actor of economic theory, even if it cannot paint a complete picture of all 
human action, see Prentice, supra note 26, at 1765–67, but it does counsel against 
repeating the same mistake of theoretical over-generalizing that afflicted the approach of 
law and economics. 
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elevate the transaction to an express agreement as to the terms.  
Except in rare cases involving extreme overreaching, commercial law 
would properly enforce such an agreement reached by express 
manifestation of an intention to incorporate only one party’s terms. 
The point, of course, is that § 2-207 is premised on the assumption 
that most commercial parties do not have the time or the inclination 
to negotiate an agreement to this level of detail, nor will either party 
want to sacrifice the deal by insisting that the other party agree to all 
of its terms.  Many commercial parties are likely to proceed with the 
transaction despite the “battling” notation on the signature line, as 
long as they both believe that they have successfully powered-up the 
force-field protections of § 2-207. 
 As indicated above, though, parties will move aggressively to adopt 
click-wrap contracting to achieve the advantages of computerization 
and to ensure that their terms are incorporated in the contract.  Faced 
with a click-wrap offer, a commercial party might pursue several 
strategies to overcome the developing click-wrap dogma that the 
offering party’s terms will exclusively govern the transaction.  Perhaps 
the most direct response would be to use actual express assent to 
establish the terms of the contract.  For parties that anticipate an 
ongoing relationship, it might be cost-effective for them to negotiate 
detailed terms that could be embodied in a master agreement that 
establishes important terms such as those governing default or the 
means for resolving disputes.  This strategy would counter the 
purported agreement of the click-wrap format with a genuinely 
express (dickered) agreement between the parties. 
 Nevertheless, there are likely to be several problems with 
addressing the click-wrap scenario in this direct manner.  One of the 
primary functions of the battle of the forms was that it empowered the 
parties to raise the contracting force-field of § 2-207 to protect 
themselves without having to negotiate all of the pertinent terms of 
the agreement.  In contrast, the “master agreement” strategy imposes 
significant additional costs on the parties and is unlikely to be widely 
utilized in everyday transactions.  More important, the master 
agreement will not be able to thwart terms incorporated by later click-
wrap ordering, because § 2-209 ensures that modifications are 
enforceable without additional consideration.  Even the most carefully 
negotiated master agreement can be negated by the terms that the 
buyer might be deemed to have later expressly accepted by clicking “I 
agree,” to the extent that these later terms are effective modifications 
of the master agreement under the liberal provisions of § 2-209(1), (2) 
and (3), or constitute a waiver of rights under § 2-209(4) and (5).  
Even if the master agreement contains a “no oral modification” clause, 
contemporary commercial law regards an electronic assent to a click-
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wrap agreement as creating a record sufficient to support the 
modification of the master agreement.  The parties might provide in 
the master agreement that all modifications must be in written form, 
rather than electronic form, but this would jeopardize subsequent 
minor modifications that might be concluded by an exchange of e-
mails and thereby disrupt reasonable commercial expectations.31 
 The difficulties that arise in preventing later modifications would 
best be handled by the general obligation of the parties to deal with 
each other in good faith.32  Because modifications are construed as a 
continuation of the original agreement that would require additional 
consideration, rather than as a new agreement, all modifications 
trigger the parties’ general obligation to act in good faith when 
performing or enforcing their rights under the contract.33  Courts 
might be tempted to characterize the seller’s actions as being in bad 
faith (both as dishonesty in fact and also as actions that do not 
conform to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) if the 
seller countermands the terms of the master agreement through click-
wrap contracting rather than by obtaining actual assent to the change 
in terms.  This seemingly sensible characterization raises a quandary 
for the courts, though, because it forces them to acknowledge the lack 
of genuine assent that is part of most click-wrap contracting.  Some 
courts might find that the strong validation of click-wrap agreements 
in legal precedents ties their hands, while others might distinguish the 
situation in light of the reasonable expectations engendered by the 
master agreement.  To summarize, parties are likely to hesitate to use 
master agreements because the added time and cost might not be 
successful in withstanding a click-wrap modification.34 
 
31 The principle of freedom of contract is recognized both in the UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS 
ACT § 5 (2000) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2) (2000), effectively permitting parties to agree not to accept electronic 
records for contracting purposes.  The traditional “battle of the forms” would also provide 
force-field protections to the parties at the secondary level of modification.  If two parties 
reached a master agreement, and then one party enclosed a standard form invoice with the 
goods, it would be ineffective unless accepted by the recipient.  In the event that parties to 
a master agreement exchanged forms with respect to a particular shipment, the force-field 
protections of U.C.C. § 2-207 would guide the determination of the terms if the non-
mirroring forms created an agreement to modify under U.C.C. §§ 2-207 (1) and 2-209. 
32 U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 2 (2000). 
33 Id., § 1-304 provides that every performance and enforcement of a contractual duty must 
be undertaken in good faith. 
34 Because most ongoing contractual relationships governed by a master agreement are 
relational in nature, it would be unlikely that the seller would seek to gain and enforce an 
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 The most difficult scenario involves a pure click-wrap transaction, 
in which the only documentation of the transaction occurs when the 
buyer enters data on the seller’s website and then clicks “I agree.”  The 
buyer can invoke § 2-207 only by countering with its own form, but in 
an Internet setting this can be difficult.  A buyer could click “I agree,” 
and then type “assent is withheld unless seller agrees to the terms and 
conditions located at http://www.goodspurchaser.com/terms.html” in 
a space provided for comments or additional details.  This action 
would transform the transaction into a typical “battle of the forms” 
scenario, which would give effect to both parties’ force-field under § 2-
207. 
 However, there may be a number of difficulties with this attempt 
to invoke § 2-207 in the click-wrap context.  First, there may be an 
issue regarding the effectiveness of the notation on the click-wrap site 
if the party’s business is completely automated.  Although the Uniform 
Computer Information Transaction Act (“UCITA”) has failed and no 
longer is supported by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), in 
some respects it might represent something akin to a Restatement 
and, therefore, be influential in how courts address these issues.  
UCITA § 206(c) provides that the terms of a contract concluded 
between an electronic agent and a person does not “include a term 
provided by the individual if the individual had reason to know that 
the electronic agent could not react to the term.”35  In short, when 
 
advantage over the buyer through click-wrap modifications.  But despite the fact that many 
commercial dealings are relational, the courthouses never seem to want for business.  The 
scenario that I describe in the text is most likely to occur if there is a serious problem with 
the business relationship caused by economic distress or party animosity that leads both 
parties to direct their lawyers to fight for the upper hand.  At this point, the standard terms 
and conditions associated with the “I agree” button will be mined for their value, and the 
other party is likely to be surprised that it may have continually overridden the master 
agreement through the years with click-wrap modifications. 
35 An “electronic agent” is defined as “a computer program, or electronic or other 
automated means, used independently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic 
messages or performances, on the person’s behalf without review or action by an individual 
at the time of the action or response to the message or performance.”  UNIF. COMPUTER 
INFO. TRANSACTION ACT § 102(a)(27) (1999). 
Amended Article 2 embodies this same principle regarding contract formation in an 
electronic environment.  U.C.C. § 2-204(4)(b) (2003) (“A contract is formed if the 
individual takes actions that the individual is free to refuse to take or makes a statement, 
and the individual has reason to know that the actions or statements will: . . . (ii) indicate 
acceptance of an offer, regardless of other expressions or actions by the individual to which 
the electronic agent cannot react.”).  As explained in comment 5, this “subsection validates 
an anonymous click-through transaction,” but leaves the determination of the terms to  
§ 2-207.  Id. 
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dealing with an automated website, a party is unlikely to prevail on 
the basis of its attempt to inject terms into the transaction.  A more 
practical problem arises if the website simply does not provide any 
space to make such a notation; this scenario leaves the other party no 
option other than to abort the transaction, or, complete it and then 
send its form by traditional means after placing the order.  Adopting a 
“battling form sent later” approach will, undoubtedly, be ineffective 
because the click-wrap agreement would constitute a final agreement, 
with the later documentation being viewed as a proposal for 
modification that must be expressly accepted by the party in order to 
be effective against it. 
 Therefore, as parties adopt a click-wrap approach to contracting, it 
will be difficult to maintain the advantages that § 2-207 has brought to 
commercial contracting, unless the parties find that it is economical to 
conclude a master agreement that is drafted in a manner that 
attempts to make inadvertent modifications through future click-wrap 
transactions ineffective.  Consequently, courts will likely need to find a 
doctrinal substitute for the increasingly moribund § 2-207. 
III. AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
 Commercial parties generally are left to their own fate when they 
have agreed to contract terms through an express manifestation of 
their assent, inasmuch as most protective legislation and case law is 
oriented toward consumers who are viewed as unskilled and 
unpracticed in the ways of contracting and commerce.  Consequently, 
a commercial party that finds itself subject to click-wrap agreements 
that include unforeseen and undesirable terms will not have many 
available strategies for avoiding them.  Many commentators will argue 
that the reputational constraints of the market will provide a sufficient 
check on overreaching, but this response misses the crux of the 
problem.36  A party seeking the efficiencies of web-based transactions 
is likely to employ a legal team that will draft terms and conditions 
designed to provide every bit of leverage possible for the extreme 
cases or situations, knowing that the party is likely to proceed, in most 
cases, on the basis of sound business practice rather than with the goal 
 
36 See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinkski, supra note 26, at 443–45 (arguing that market 
constraints are real but imperfect, and suggesting the need for judicial intervention); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 
976–80 (2005) (describing market constraints on exploitive seller behavior but 
acknowledging that they may be “insufficient to constrain sellers’ tendencies to exploit 
buyers” and might call for regulatory intervention). 
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of exacting every benefit available under the strict terms of the 
agreement.37  Questions arise in the fringe cases, when parties cease 
 
 
37 Stewart Macaulay summarized this commercial reality in his commentary on the 
significance of Ian Macneil’s relational theory of contract.   
Some firms attempt to arm themselves with end-game strategies by 
placing “heads I win, tails you lose” clauses in form contracts unlikely to 
be read until trouble arises. . . . Firms hide loopholes in the fine print, 
knowing that these terms will not be the subject of negotiations.  These 
terms are used to ward off legal liability by providing bright-line rules.  
Rather than having to prove such things as fraud, material failure of 
performance, or substantial breach, the firm’s lawyers give themselves 
an easy-to-establish standard.   
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the 
Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bermstien, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 796 (2000).   
The factors leading some parties to “load up” the terms and conditions are straightforward:   
Furthermore, as some commentators have argued, businesses 
themselves might be ignorant of the terms offered in their boilerplate 
agreements.  Businesses often delegate the job of drafting their terms to 
lawyers, who believe that they can best serve their clients by composing 
an arsenal of one-sided terms without regard to the business 
environment, or for that matter, anything else.  In addition, business 
managers might rely on some of the same cognitive processes that affect 
consumers.  In particular businesses might worry too much about 
protecting themselves from rare events, overestimating the likelihood of 
such events because of a few salient incidents.   
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 26, at 444.   
There may be industries, indeed many industries, in which competitive pressures lead 
parties to draft even-handed terms, but it would be foolish to assume that this holds true   
throughout the commercial world.  The problem arises when one of the parties suddenly 
ignores the “bargain in fact of the parties” and insists upon compliance with form 
documents long-since filed and largely ignored during the course of the relationship.  As 
Macaulay observes: 
[The] legal staff may write a detailed contract that is not understood by 
the executive representing the corporation in negotiations.  This is 
likely to be the case when it is a complex printed standard-form 
agreement.  The executive negotiating the contract will know that the 
people on the other side will not read and understand the document.  
Moreover, the executive may know that the other side is unlikely to 
have the document reviewed by a lawyer.  Then all business is 
transacted in ways inconsistent with the lawyer’s contract, which has 
been buried in the files.  If a court allows such a written contract to wipe 
out a history of interaction, then its decision may be based on 
expectations and reliance only in a fictional sense. 
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operating on the basis of business goals and relationships, and seek to 
maximize their legally enforceable rights.  Moreover, reputational 
constraints are not a unitary check on a particular party’s behavior.  
Customer relations imperatives may shape the treatment of most 
customers most of the time, but not all customers all of the time.38  
 
Macaulay, supra note 37, at 795.  The punch line, though, comes with Macaulay’s 
observation that when the end-game arrives and the lawyers run for the form documents, 
“Section 2-207 of the Code attempts to sort out the mess.”  Id. at 798.  With the “battle of 
the forms” era drawing to a close, we may be left with only a formalist mess. 
38 A commercial party might believe that putting extreme one-sided terms in its forms is 
justified because it will invoke these terms only when faced with a “bad buyer.”  Clayton P. 
Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WISC. L. REV.  679, 703–13 
(2004).  Of course, this discretion provides latitude for the party to exercise these rights in 
ways that are not benign.  Id. at 707–08.  Additionally, this argument ignores the fact that 
parties seeking to enforce their standard terms will be as subject to the limits of cognition 
caused by heuristics and biases as the other party when considering the standard terms.  
Ichiro Kobayashi makes a similar point in connection with consumer transactions in 
greater detail: 
Suppose that a seller repeatedly sells machines to buyers and the seller 
regularly accepts refunds out of concern for his reputation.  The seller 
does not desire to include in a contract a clause that the seller accepts 
any refund because the clause may not give the buyer incentives to use 
the machine in an appropriate manner.  Contracting parties do not 
explicitly write the seller’s refund policy in their contract.  Put another 
way, parties intentionally write stricter contract terms, and the fair 
distribution of costs and benefits is delegated to a flexible application of 
informal norms.  Transactional substance is expelled out of the formal 
legal regime, and contracting parties create non-legal norms to reflect 
any substance.   
Ichiro Kobayashi, Private Contracting and Business Models of Electronic Commerce, 13 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 161, 172 (2005).   
Kobayashi suggests that the normative implication of this new business reality is that 
consumers might legitimately be bound to unread electronic terms as the cost of obtaining 
the firm’s business model.  Id. at 183–84.  Courts should intervene on behalf of consumers 
only when the written terms exploit consumers in a manner that is outside the scope of the 
business model’s protective features (citing the Specht case as an example), but not with 
respect to a dispute that is within the scope of the incentive mechanisms established by the 
business model (citing the ProCD case).  Id. at 184–85. 
Kobayashi’s approach to consumer contracting is consistent with my focus on the need for 
courts to ensure that agreements are enforced to protect the “reasonable expectations” of 
commercial parties, although he frames his argument in the language of efficiency: 
To summarize, because electronic commerce is more automated and 
standardized than paper-based transactions, contract term 
interpretation must be made by considering the overall business model 
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This is not so much to say that the legal clauses are unimportant, as to 
recognize that the legal regime is relatively unimportant for much of 
everyday commercial life.39  However, the enforceable terms of the 
 
and its embedded incentive mechanisms that support informal self-
enforcement. . . . It allocates formal and informal regimes so well that 
relatively formalistic interpretation of contract terms (whether those 
terms are browsewrapped or clickwrapped in a website screen) are 
generally justified as an interpretation principle.  This does not mean 
that courts should not consider consumer exploitation, market Internet 
fraud, or other failure of efficient allocation of costs and benefits arising 
from the novelty of electronic commerce.  Although courts are unlikely 
to emphasize an aspect of contract formation procedure, where 
accessibility to those online terms and adequate notice are especially 
questioned, such requirements of accessibility and adequate notice do 
not necessarily give equitable solutions to each dispute. . . . This article 
therefore suggests that when such issues concerning consumer 
protection are argued, courts must at least be sensitive to overall 
efficiency underlying the merchant’s business model in interpreting 
contract terms. 
Id. at 185–86. 
This theoretical defense of one-sided terms, even when tempered by Kobayashi’s 
recognition of the need for judicial protection in certain respects, does not appear to be 
relevant to the sphere of commercial transactions.  A recent article suggests that one-sided 
contracts may prove efficient in circumstances where the offering party (generally, a 
commercial seller) is bound by reputational constraints, but the accepting party (generally, 
a sporadic buyer in a competitive market) is not, since the one-sided terms permit the 
seller to police overreaching by buyers.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-
Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).  The 
authors correctly note that this rationale loses much of its force when applied to 
commercial transactions, since commercial buyers presumably are equally motivated by 
reputational constraints as are sellers.  Id. at 835.  Thus, even Kobayashi’s recognition of 
the limits of the theory when applied to consumer transactions provides an insufficient 
corrective because the theoretical presuppositions no longer hold when the transaction is a 
commercial transaction. 
39 A recent article suggests that business models of electronic commerce have developed to 
ensure performance and, thereby, avoid the costs of legal action, especially given the lack of 
reputational constraints in a highly dynamic global marketplace with relatively easy entry.  
Kobayashi, supra note 38, at 170.  Kobayashi details how “operators of electronic 
commerce invented various bonding mechanisms, such as credit card chargeback systems, 
online payment mechanisms, electronic money, escrow services, and online feedback 
systems” to counterbalance reputational deficits.  Id. at 171. 
The Internet may very well develop in ways that empower parties subject to standard-form 
click-wrap agreements, which suggests that courts should regard these developments as an 
important part of the commercial context when assessing the validity of agreements.  This 
would shift the debate from unpersuasive arguments about the effect of marginal 
consumers protecting all consumers by means of their ex ante review of terms, to a more 
plausible claim that ex post analysis of contract terms offered by commercial parties in 
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contract will have very real effects on the parties’ behavior in the event 
of severe financial distress, traumatic market realignment, or 
animosity between the contracting parties that drives the parties to 
call in the litigators and unleash their fury.40  The important question 
remains:  if the parties have entered a click-wrap agreement, does the 
law place any limits on the exercise of contract prerogative even if 
imposing these limits is necessary only in exceptional cases? 
 In cases that involve truly egregious oppression, the courts might 
use the doctrine of unconscionability to free a commercial party from 
such terms, but courts have set a high bar for commercial parties to 
prevail on an unconscionability analysis.  At present, courts are 
unlikely to extend the safety-valve function of unconscionability from 
the consumer context to general commercial parties, except in the 
most egregious cases that most closely resemble an oppressive 
consumer transaction. 
 An alternative strategy would be to argue that standard form 
adhesion contracts that are formed by click-wrap technology should 
be enforced according to the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
rather than according to a literalist and context-free reading of the 
boilerplate language.  This legal strategy would confront the issues 
raised when commercial parties lose the force-field protection of  
§ 2-207 in the emerging electronic contracting environment, but may 
be even less likely to succeed than an expansion of the 
unconscionability safety-valve.  What is at stake in the reasonable 
expectations challenge to click-wrap agreements is no less than the 
 
competitive markets can be communicated effectively to prospective consumers in a 
variety of ways.  See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: A Fresh 
Approach to Online Standard Form Contracts in the Age of Online User Participation 
(Draft 2007), 57, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
984765#PaperDownload (developing policy prescriptions for regulatory intervention 
based on the degree to which there is an abundant “ex post-ex ante information flow” that 
can “deter firms the vendor from including imbalanced provisions” in their standard form 
contracts).  See also Raymond T. Nimmer, 2 Info. Law § 12:47 (2004) (“The online 
environment, however, often offers wider alternatives and greater sources of information 
that, even in consumer transactions often renders [the doctrines of unconscionability and 
reasonable expectations] inapplicable. . . . Indeed, the online environment, which is less 
pressured and can permit closer review of terms by a potential user would seem to weigh 
more often in favor of more strongly enforcing those agreements.”).  Of course, this 
assumption is subject to empirical challenge by those who question the ability of parties to 
optimize their behavior by considering all available information.  See sources cited supra 
note 26. 
40 This is best characterized as “going into Warren Zevon mode.”  See WARREN ZEVON, 
LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY, EXCITABLE BOY (Elektra Records 1978) (“Send lawyers, guns 
and money/The shit has hit the fan.”). 
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“soul of contract law,”41 and it is quite possible that the devil may 
already have sealed this deal. 
 To provide a focus for the following discussion, it will be helpful to 
think about a hypothetical case that permits consideration of the 
issues in concrete terms.  Consider the case of an attorney who resigns 
from her firm to purchase an indoor tennis facility in her town.  She 
will manage not only the tennis and fitness memberships, but also a 
pro shop that sells a variety of merchandise manufactured by national 
corporations.  As she begins “ordering” from the manufacturers over 
the Internet, she constantly clicks “I agree” after entering the relevant 
data, assuming that the boilerplate terms are unexceptional, and in 
any event are nonnegotiable.  Moreover, she uses sophisticated 
software to manage her membership, schedule courts, and maintain 
financial records, and this software package proclaims that it is 
subject to End-User License Agreements (“EULAs”).  This is not only a 
commercial transaction, but also one that is entered into by a 
sophisticated individual.   
 Is it automatically the case that every term included as part of the 
click-wrap agreement should be binding, regardless of the nature of 
the term or the relevant circumstances?  Would she be bound to 
permit the software vendor to access her computer, to refrain from 
customizing the software for her needs, and even to refrain from 
publicly criticizing the software?  Would she have to arbitrate disputes 
in a distant venue?  Would she be subject to restrictions on how she 
promoted and sold the name-brand merchandise to her customers?  
Would her ability to return merchandise be subject to specific and 
time-sensitive restrictions?   
 To make this hypothetical scenario realistic, one should assume 
that the seller is experiencing some form of financial distress, or that 
the market is experiencing similar disruption, leading the seller to 
seek to exact the full benefit of the terms drafted by its legal staff. 
A.  UNCONSCIONABILITY ANALYSIS 
 The first line of defense, although unlikely to succeed in many 
cases, is to argue that one or more terms of the click-wrap agreement 
are unenforceable because they are unconscionable.  Common 
wisdom holds that commercial parties are rarely afforded relief under 
§ 2-302, and the cases cited by the treatise writers bear out this 
 
41 Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 23, 57 (1998). 
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wisdom.42  Courts regularly make statements to this effect as if it were 
a principle of the doctrine itself.43  The commercial cases in which 
courts have invoked the unconscionability doctrine to police the 
agreement invariably involve parties who are unschooled farmers, 
poorly educated small business owners, and other “quasi-consumers” 
acting in a commercial capacity.44  Judge Posner manifested this 
 
42 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, U.C.C. § 4-9, at 237 (4th ed. 1995) (citing 
cases for the proposition that “courts have not generally been solicitous of business persons 
in the name of unconscionability”); 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE 
SERIES § 2-302:6 (regarding the applicability of the doctrine to commercial transactions).  
Hawkland summarizes: 
One remarkable pattern has emerged from the hundred cases or so that 
have been decided to date under Section 2-302, and this is that the 
doctrine of unconscionability is not a major force in transactions 
between business entities.  Stated conversely, the doctrine has been 
used almost exclusively in consumer transactions. The reasons for this 
phenomenon are plain.  For the most part, unconscionability has to do 
with taking advantage of ignorant people by imposing surprise results 
or harsh and oppressive terms on them.  Often this happens because the 
consumer has no “meaningful choice.”  That is to say, a gross inequality 
in bargaining power between the consumer, on the one hand, and a 
merchant, on the other, plus the fact that the consumer lacks the 
experience, training, skill, and help to identify alternative courses of 
action, may leave him in a “take-it-or-leave-it” position subject to 
deceitful or oppressive actions or both on the part of the other party.  
Businessmen, on the other hand, usually have alternatives available, 
and have the skill, training, experience, and help to take care of 
themselves in business deals.  Accordingly, the courts have been willing 
to distinguish commercial from consumer transactions in invoking the 
doctrine of unconscionability.  In Keystone Aeronautics v. R.J. 
Enstrom[, 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974)], for example, the court stated: ‘A 
social policy aimed at protecting the average consumer by prohibiting 
blanket immunization of the manufacturer or seller through the use of 
standardized disclaimers engenders little resistance. But when the 
setting is changed and the buyer and seller are both business entities, ... 
the social policy loses its raison d’etre.’ 
43 See TIBCO Software, v. Gordon Food Serv., No. 1:03-CV-25, 2003 WL 21683850 (W.D. 
Mich. July 3, 2003) (Unconscionability “is rarely found to exist in agreements entered into 
by two commercial parties.”); Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 
133, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (Unconscionability “is rarely found to exist in a commercial 
setting.  Citizens has failed to show that this case presents the requisite extraordinary 
circumstances.”); Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
694 P.2d 198, 204 (Wyo. 1984) (“Although a commercial purchaser is not doomed to 
failure in pressing an unconscionability claim . . . findings of unconscionability in a 
commercial setting are rare.”). 
44 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 240 (“One moral of the foregoing cases is that 
when a business-person is poorly educated, ‘over a barrel,’ or a victim of fine print, a court 
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attitude by issuing (in dictum) a warning to corporations: “[F]or 
future reference we remind Northrup and companies like it that the 
defense of unconscionability was not invented to protect multi-billion 
dollar corporations against mistakes committed by their employees, 
and indeed has rarely succeeded outside the area of consumer 
contracts.”45  On occasion, courts have been willing to employ 
unconscionability analysis in cases that do not involve extreme 
disparities in sophistication between the parties.  However, it is 
 
may invalidate a clause that otherwise would stand up between ordinary business 
persons.”); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296, 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(Plaintiff “commercial farmers” successfully argued that the form contract was 
unconscionable, with the court noting “that Harris Seed is a large national producer and 
distributor of seed, dealing here with independent, relatively small farmers” with limited 
alternative suppliers who all had adopted the offensive clause.); Johnson v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 304 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (finding that an exclusion of consequential 
damages signed by Mobil and an illiterate, high school dropout who was a gas station 
dealer was unconscionable). 
45 Northrup Corp. v. Litronic, Ltd., 29 F.3d 1173, 1179–80 (7th Cir. 1994) (cautioning 
Northrup after application of the knock-out rule under § 2-207 rendered its 
unconscionability argument moot).  See also  Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 
1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting application of the unconscionability doctrine in favor 
of a Fortune 1000 company and concluding that in “an agreement relating to confidential 
information, negotiated between commercial entities, it is not the judicial role to rewrite 
the contract and impose terms that these parties did not make.”), and Potomic Elec. Power 
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D. D.C. 1974).  The court in 
Potomic stated:  
Finally, plaintiff raises the issue of the unconscionability of the 
exculpatory clauses.  The negotiated agreement between these parties 
was not a contract between two small unknowledgeable shop keepers 
but between two sophisticated corporations each with comparable 
bargaining power and fully aware of what they were doing.  The 
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract were 
deliberate, detailed and consumed more than two years. PEPCO’s 
representatives were experienced and the final agreement was reviewed 
by their corporate legal staff.  While the evidence shows that other than 
Westinghouse, there was only one other domestic manufacturer with 
the capability of marketing the turbine-generator, there is nothing to 
indicate that PEPCO was precluded from contracting with that 
manufacturer or even foreign manufacturers.  Nor is there any evidence 
in the record showing that PEPCO was a reluctant and unwilling 
purchaser, overreached and forced to yield to onerous terms imposed 
by Westinghouse. 
Id.  See generally NIMMER, 2 INFO. LAW, supra note 39, at note 9. 
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unlikely that these cases suggest a solid basis for developing a 
response to the potential abuses of click-wrap contracting.46 
 If unconscionability plays any role in commercial click-wrap 
transactions, it will almost certainly not serve as a means for 
launching a general challenge to this mode of contracting.  In a recent 
 
46 Perhaps the best example of such a case is In re Teleserve Syss., Inc. (MCI Telecomm. 
Corp.), 230 A.D.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).  The court held that an arbitration clause 
that would require the claimant to pay a filing fee of $204,000 to initiate its claim for 
compensatory damages of $40 million was “unreasonable, unjust, and unconscionable on 
its face and may not be enforced.”  Id. at 593.  The claimant was a sophisticated entity that 
had invested over $2.4 million dollars to build a business network to perform the contract, 
and had caused subagents to invest an additional $2 million.  Invoking unconscionability 
to protect such a party is unusual.  Id. at 590.  However, the factual context surrounding 
this case is dramatic.  The claimant had been strung along for months by MCI despite 
making clear that it was in severe financial distress, and the arbitration clause in question 
was presented to the ailing claimant as part of modifications to their agreement intended 
to resolve the disputes.  Id. at 587–90.  The claimant specifically questioned the new 
arbitration clause, but stated that it had no choice but to sign the agreement.  Id. at 590.  
The large filing fee was particularly troublesome for the claimant because it had “exhausted 
its capital and ‘closed its doors’” as a result of MCI’s actions, leaving it without the ability to 
pay the filing fee.  Id. at 587.  The facts alleged by the claimant present a classic case of 
economic duress and bad faith, and the court’s unconscionability holding regarding the 
filing fee enabled the claimant to file for arbitration under the more favorable terms of the 
prior agreement and to obtain a remedy for the alleged breach by MCI. 
A more typical exceptional case (if there can be such a thing) is presented by Gianni Sport 
Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).  Gianni also involved a 
compelling set of facts and sharp differences in bargaining power.  The buyer’s form 
purchase order included a clause on the reverse side that stated: “Buyer reserves the right 
to terminate by notice to Seller all or any part of this Purchase Order with respect to Goods 
that have not actually been shipped by Seller or as to Goods which are not timely delivered 
for any reason whatsoever.”  Id. at 761.  In late September, the buyer cancelled its June 
order for an October delivery of women’s holiday clothing, leaving the seller with 
manufactured clothes but no realistic ability to find another buyer for the time-sensitive 
holiday market, leading the plaintiff to sell the clothes to the original buyer for a negotiated 
50% discount.  Id.  The court began by noting that Michigan case law applying the 
unconscionability doctrine to commercial parties “is sparse,” but found that the substantial 
difference in bargaining power between the small manufacturer and the large purchaser 
was symptomatic of the industry, and that such clauses “were standard practice because” 
the buyers were the “big sharks” that could impose terms at will.  Id. at 761–62.  The court 
affirmed the trial court’s holding that the term in question was unreasonable, and the 
parties had uneven bargaining power.  Id. at 763.  It should be noted that a more 
appropriate litigation strategy in this case would have been to challenge the buyer’s 
strategic cancellation and re-negotiation as a bad faith exercise of the buyer’s nominal 
contract rights, but perhaps the “big sharks” in this industry are so ferocious and insatiable 
as to render the “observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” a nullity, 
leading the lawyers and the court to look to the doctrine of unconscionability to find a 
normative limit for the buyer’s behavior. 
306 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 4:2 
 
 
 
 
 
click-wrap case a commercial party argued that imposing terms on a 
buyer that has already paid the purchase price by requiring consent to 
an End User License Agreement is unconscionable.  The court made 
short work of this argument, finding that this manner of contracting is 
not in itself procedurally unconscionable.47  Most courts would likely 
adopt this approach and conclude that merely requiring another party 
to signal its assent by means of a click-wrap agreement will not 
establish sufficient procedural infirmity to provide a basis for an 
unconscionability analysis.48  Courts generally use a “sliding scale” 
approach that requires some measure of both procedural and 
substantive elements of unconscionability.  The untroubled 
assumption that clicking an “I agree” icon is equivalent to manifesting 
assent makes it difficult to establish the existence of procedural 
elements of unconscionability in a commercial transaction.49 
 
47 The court stated: 
The parties in this case did have unequal bargaining power because 
Blizzard is the sole seller of its software licenses; however, the 
defendants had the choice to select a different video game, to agree to 
the terms and gain the software and access to battle.net, or to disagree 
and return the software for a full refund of their money. [The 
defendants were not ignorant consumers, but instead were savvy 
programmers who reverse engineered the source code.]  Next, there was 
no surprise about the contract terms [because the defendants were on 
notice of the terms and had thirty days to return the game].  Therefore, 
the Court finds that the licensing agreements were not procedurally 
unconscionable. 
Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (E.D. Mo. 
2004).  Because the EULA terms in question concerned the prohibition on reverse 
engineering, the court concluded without analysis that the terms did “not impose harsh or 
oppressive terms” and therefore were not substantively unconscionable. Id. at 1180.  
Courts sometimes note that commercial parties simply will not be given relief even from 
terms that are procedurally unconscionable to some degree.  See O’Quin v. Verizon 
Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (M.D. La. 2003) (holding that shrink-wrap/terms-later 
contracting is enforceable, and noting that “courts in Louisiana and elsewhere have 
countenanced some modicum of adhesionary terms, or evidence of procedural 
unconscionability in contract formation, in the name of ‘economic efficiency’”). 
48 Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d, at 239–42 (holding that click-wrap contracting is not 
procedurally unconscionable, and the forum selection clause is not substantively 
unconscionable); In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341, at *5–7 
(holding that click-wrap contracting is not procedurally unconscionable, and the 
arbitration clause is not substantively unconscionable). 
49 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) 
(noting that the “more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of 
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
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 On a few occasions, courts have found terms to be unconscionable 
even in the absence of procedural unconscionability, including the 
infamous shrink-wrap (terms in the box) case, Brower v. Gateway, 
2000.50  On careful examination, though, Brower proves that click-
wrap contracts between commercial parties will not be amenable to 
unconscionability analysis.  In Brower, a class of plaintiffs seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged deceptive practices by 
Gateway opposed a motion to dismiss that argued the complaint was 
subject to arbitration.  The court first held that the agreement was a 
“rolling contract” that was not concluded until the consumers ordered 
their computer by mail or phone, received the item with the detailed 
terms enclosed, and then retained the item for more than the thirty-
day return period specified in the enclosed terms.51  The court fully 
effectuated the shrink-wrap contract, finding that “the disputed 
arbitration clause is simply one provision of the sole contract 
proposed between the parties,” rather than a term proposed by the 
seller after the purchase.52  The court also specifically rejected the idea 
that the arbitration clause was unenforceable solely because it was 
contained in a standard form contract presented to the consumers.  In 
doing so, the court reasoned that the consumers had thirty days 
within which to examine the product, and the proposed terms before 
the contract was concluded.53 
 
enforceable, and vice versa”); Tacoma Boatbuilding v. Delta Fishing, Nos. 165-72C3–168-
72C3, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830, at *20 n.20 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1980) (“Of course, the 
substantive/procedural analysis is more of a sliding scale than a true dichotomy.  The 
harsher the clause, the less ‘bargaining naughtiness’ that is required to establish 
unconscionability.”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 42, § 4–7 (regarding the relation of 
procedural to substantive unconscionability and quoting the Tacoma case).  If there is no 
recognized procedural unconscionability at work in a case involving two commercial 
parties, it seems highly unlikely that a court would invalidate a term of their agreement 
under unconscionability analysis. 
In a recent article, Robert Hillman argues that proposals to require businesses to post their 
e-commerce terms on their website to permit consumers and industry watchdogs to review 
the terms prior to deciding to make a purchase might backfire because consumers are very 
likely to remain uninformed but the pre-disclosure would likely narrow consumer rights by 
eliminating a plausible claim of procedural unconscionability.  Robert A. Hillman, Online 
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-standard Terms Backfire?, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 837, 854 (2006). 
50 Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
51 Id. at 572. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 572–73. 
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 However, the arbitration provision required the consumers to 
arbitrate their disputes in Chicago pursuant to the International 
Chamber of Commerce  (“ICC”) rules.  The practical effect of this term 
was that the typical consumer seeking actual damages of $1,000 
would have to pay a $4,000 advance fee (including $2,000 that was 
nonrefundable even if the consumer prevailed), mail all of the 
paperwork regarding the arbitration to the ICC offices in France, 
travel to Chicago for the arbitration hearing, and be subject to paying 
Gateway’s legal fees if Gateway prevailed.  Needless to say, the dispute 
resolution clause eliminated any practical means for consumers to 
obtain relief.  It is widely known that the court held that this term was 
unconscionable, but the details of the court’s reasoning are only rarely 
analyzed in detail. 
  The court first held that there were no elements of procedural 
unconscionability, repeating its analysis that the shrink-wrap method 
of contracting provided the consumer with sufficient time to review 
the offered terms, which were not buried in dense text or otherwise 
hidden from view.  The court noted that “the substantive element 
alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the provision at issue 
unenforceable.”54  However, one of the cases cited as a precedent 
provides what is certainly a more accurate description in noting that 
“there have been exceptional cases where a provision of the contract is 
so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of 
substantive unconscionability alone.”55  The Brower court concluded 
that the “excessive cost factor” in arbitrating a dispute was 
substantively unconscionable as a matter of law, but upheld the 
agreement of the parties to arbitrate their dispute in Chicago.56  Thus, 
 
54 Id. at 574. 
55 Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that 
the term in question was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable).  Most of 
the cases cited by the court did not find a term to be unconscionable solely on the basis of 
substantive oppression.  One of the cited cases did refer to the classic case of a door-to-
door salesperson grossly overcharging welfare recipients for consumer goods.  See Jones v. 
Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (but this is hardly the model of a 
case that involves no element of procedural unconscionability).  
The court did cite In re Teleserve Syss., 659 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (finding an arbitration clause 
between two sophisticated business entities to be unconscionable), but as explained in note 
46, supra, the factual circumstances in this case hardly support the idea that a contract 
term may be declared unconscionable as a matter of law. 
56 Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574–55 (“vacating that portion of the arbitration agreement as 
requires arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce,” having already found 
that “the possible inconvenience of the chosen site (Chicago) alone” does not rise “to the 
2008] MOOTZ 309 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
the victory was not particularly meaningful for the plaintiffs now faced 
with the obligation to travel to Chicago to seek arbitration of their 
individual claims, rather than pursuing a class action. 
 There are cases that take a more liberal approach to 
unconscionability in the electronic contracting setting, but these cases 
are undoubtedly outliers.  A Pennsylvania Federal District Court 
Judge, applying California law, recently ruled in Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc.57 that a click-wrap agreement to arbitrate disputes was 
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  This result is 
even more extraordinary in light of the fact that the plaintiff was an 
attorney who sued a virtual world Internet website for seizing “virtual” 
property worth thousands of dollars that he had acquired at the site.  
Essentially, the court held that a sophisticated plaintiff engaged in 
(virtual) commercial transactions was not subject to an arbitration 
clause contained in a click-wrap contract. 
 In Bragg, the court first held that the arbitration clause included 
in the “fourteenth line of the thirteenth paragraph under the heading 
‘GENERAL PROVISIONS’ and following provisions regarding the 
applicability of export and import laws” was procedurally 
unconscionable because it was part of an adhesion contract presented 
by a party with stronger bargaining power regarding a product that 
could not be attained elsewhere on the Internet.58  The court found 
that the arbitration clause was “buried” in the Terms of Service, and 
that these Terms included no explanation of, or reference to, the 
extensive fees and cumbersome rules that were triggered by requiring 
arbitration by three arbitrators operating under the Rules of 
Arbitration of the ICC.59  The court conceded that Bragg’s 
sophistication mitigated the elements of procedural unconscionability, 
but that the weakness of this element was counterbalanced by extreme 
substantive unconscionability.60 
 
level of unconscionability”).  See also  Hauenstein v. Softwrap Ltd., No. C07-0572MJP, 
2007 WL 2404624 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007) (holding that an arbitration clause 
requiring that the parties arbitrate in London is not unconscionable). 
57 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d. 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
58 Id. at 603–04.  The court cited Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) for support, but the district court in Comb emphasized that PayPal customers were 
not sophisticated parties, the average transaction amount was $55, and the services offered 
by PayPal might have been unique to some degree.  Id. at 1173. 
59 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
60 Id. at 606–10. 
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 Similar to the arbitration provision in Brower, Bragg was required 
to arbitrate his disputes under the costly ICC rules in a distant venue, 
whereas the defendant was permitted to seize his assets and terminate 
the agreement at its sole discretion.61  The court essentially concluded 
that the agreement precluded an effective remedy for breach, 
providing instead a “one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost 
all situations” in favor of the defendant.62  In the end, Bragg appears 
to be the same case as Brower with the one critical difference that, 
rather than relying exclusively on substantive unconscionability, the 
court found that California law considers all adhesion contracts to be 
prima facie evidence of procedural unconscionability.63 
 
61 Id. at 607–12. 
62 Id. at 611. 
63 The California Supreme Court has not yet adopted this reading of the unconscionability 
statute, but the federal courts in Bragg and Comb both cited Flores v. Transamerica 
HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (1st Dist. 2001) for this  proposition.  This 
element of the Flores opinion has been criticized by other divisions of the Court of Appeals.  
See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1318 (4th Dist. 2005) 
(The court criticized Flores by noting that “courts often reflexively conclude the finding of 
an adhesion contract alone satisfies the procedural prong, and immediately move on to the 
subject of substantive unconscionability,” and holding that recognizing the agreement “as 
an adhesion contract . . . heralds the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry into its 
enforceability.”).  Consequently, not all courts endorse the Flores rule.  See Burke v. E-Bay, 
Inc., 2007 WL 1219697 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding that the forum selection clause 
under a later iteration of the eBay agreement that was at issue in Comb was enforceable). 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Nagramp v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 
2006) provides a good indication of the current state of California law.  By a 7-5 margin, 
the court held that an arbitration provision in a click-wrap contract was unconscionable.  
Finding that under “current California law, it is unclear whether a contract of adhesion is 
inherently oppressive, and therefore automatically procedurally unconscionable or 
whether oppression is a separate element that must be present,” the court concluded that 
procedural unconscionability is present when an adhesion contract is presented by a party 
with superior bargaining power to a party that has no meaningful choice or ability to 
negotiate.  Id. at 1281.  Although the contract was a commercial franchise agreement 
offered to a sophisticated party with experience in the industry, the court concluded that 
“MailCoups had overwhelming bargaining power, drafted the contract, and presented it to 
Nagrampa on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  While we acknowledge that the evidence of 
procedural unconscionability appears minimal, it is sufficient to require us, under 
California law, to reach the second prong of the unconscionability analysis.”  Id. at 1284.  
The arbitration provision was deemed substantively unconscionable because it permitted 
MailCoups to secure judicial relief and forced the plaintiff to travel to Boston to arbitrate 
her claims, and so “even though the evidence of procedural unconscionability is slight, the 
evidence of substantive unconscionability is strong enough to tip the scale and render the 
arbitration provision unconscionable.”  Id. at 1293.  Because California law requires some 
measure of procedural unconscionability to support an unconscionability analysis, the 
2008] MOOTZ 311 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
 Against this backdrop, the doctrine of unconscionability does not 
hold much promise for commercial parties after the battle of the 
forms has ceased to provide them with force-field like protection.  
Although it is conceivable that courts might act if one or more terms 
imposed by a click-wrap agreement are grossly oppressive, it is far 
more likely that they would do so if there was some measure of 
 
Flores rule might best be interpreted as boosting a party over the nominal procedural 
unconscionability requirement when the complaining party is in a much weaker position 
and is subjected to an adhesion contract that contains terms that are grossly unfair that the 
court deems unacceptable.  See Pickens v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2004 WL 339594, *7 (Cal. 
App. Feb. 24, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (The court held that because “the only 
procedurally unconscionable aspect of the late fee [that the consumer plaintiff] can identify 
is the fact that it was presented as part of a take-it-or-leave-it contract . . . this may be 
enough to show a minimal level of procedural unconscionability [but the consumer 
plaintiff] must make a correspondingly much stronger showing of substantive 
unconscionability to survive summary judgment.”). 
Consequently, the surprising result in Bragg may not suggest that click-wrap commercial 
contracts may easily be found to be unconscionable.  The limitations of the Bragg case are 
best illustrated in a case decided by the same court, speaking through a different judge, two 
months earlier.  In Feldman v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 966011 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) the 
court found that a lawyer’s click-wrap agreement for Google’s advertising services was 
enforceable under California law, concluding that a “reasonably prudent internet user 
would have known of the existence of terms in the AdWords agreement.”  Id. at *9.  The 
court found that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable, beginning with the 
decisive characterization that Flores provides that a term “may be procedurally 
unconscionable if it is an adhesion contract.”  Id. at *10 (emphasis added).  Because other 
internet businesses offered advertising services, the court also concluded that the 
agreement was not a classic adhesion contract. 
A contract is not necessarily one of adhesion simply because it is a form 
contract.  Courts have recognized the prevalence and importance of 
standardized contracts in people’s everyday lives. . . .Because Plaintiff 
was a sophisticated purchaser, was not in any way pressured to agree to 
the AdWords Agreement, was capable of understanding the 
Agreement’s terms, consented to them, and could have rejected the 
Agreement with impunity, this court finds that the AdWords Agreement 
was not procedurally unconscionable.   
Id. at *11.  This case, seemingly directly at odds with the result in Bragg two months later, 
would appear to capture the sentiment of a strong majority of courts.  See supra notes 47–
48 and accompanying text. 
The cases can also be distinguished by the fact that Bragg concerned a grossly unfair 
dispute resolution clause that effectively eliminated an effective remedy, whereas Feldman 
involved only a forum selection clause.  The lesson of the Bragg case appears to be that 
courts might find a clause unconscionable even in a commercial transaction under extreme 
facts.  See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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procedural unconscionability as well.  In most jurisdictions, the case 
law indicates clearly that courts are highly unlikely to find that the 
click-wrap format itself gives rise to a claim of procedural 
unconscionability between commercial parties.  Bragg provides 
precedent to the contrary, but it establishes a minimum of procedural 
unconscionability only on the strength of the court’s finding that 
California law so regards all adhesion contracts.64 
B.  JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS  
OF COMMERCIAL PARTIES 
 Click-wrap contracting is a mode of presenting standard terms in 
what might be argued is a more “adhesive” mode than traditional 
standard form agreements because there is no fine print on the 
reverse side of a document that conceivably could be crossed out or 
changed prior to signing.65  As a general rule, courts interpret 
adhesion contracts strictly against a commercial party seeking the 
assent of a consumer, resulting in a kind of “super contra 
proferentem.”  In some cases the courts’ analysis outstrips the 
boundaries of contra proferentem entirely, and results in decisions 
that the terms of an adhesion contract simply will not be enforced 
when they deviate from the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
 The modern “Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations” was 
conceptualized by Robert Keeton to explain a number of insurance 
coverage cases that otherwise lacked a coherent and consistent 
justification.66  Once articulated, a number of states actively 
 
64 This makes choice of law provisions in click-wrap agreements even more important, as 
demonstrated in Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding 
that the venue provision was unconscionable under California law, but noting that the 
result would have been different under Colorado law). 
65 Some cases suggest that click-wrap contracts are designed to discourage review of the 
terms by the buyer.  See Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum 
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1043–45 (2005) (citing 
Scarcella v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 WL 2093429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Sept. 8, 2004) as an 
example).  See sources cited supra note 26 that lend support to a criticism of courts that 
are unwilling to assess the cognitive differences between a consumer signing a paper form 
with boilerplate terms and that same consumer engaging in click-wrap contracting, and 
that can be extended to a broader critique of the assumptions about commercial parties. 
66 See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions: Part One, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (arguing that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations 
of the applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will 
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provision would have negated 
those expectations”).  Subsequent academic commentary on the Doctrine of Reasonable 
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developed the Doctrine by expressly interpreting insurance policies in 
a manner that could not be squared with the precise language of the 
policy, effectively broadening the coverage afforded thereby.67  These 
courts openly acknowledged that the development of the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations was a necessary adjustment to fundamental 
shifts in the formation of insurance contracts since the days when ship 
owners and underwriters negotiated coverage in Lloyd’s Coffee 
House.68  However, there is nothing intrinsic to the Doctrine of 
 
Expectations includes: Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the 
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000); 
Symposium: The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After Three 
Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mark C. 
Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable 
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).  
67 As Kenneth Abraham has suggested, in addition to making insurance law, judges 
sometimes make insurance.  KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 100–32 (1986). 
68 See Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1982), in which the court 
made this point clearly: 
Thus, if this were the ordinary contract, we would have no hesitation in 
holding the parties to their agreement, providing the limitation period 
was not so short as to be against public policy and that the terms of the 
contract were not so unconscionable that unfair advantage was being 
taken of the person in an inferior bargaining position.  Whatever the 
historic origin of the insurance contract, we cannot close our eyes to 
present-day reality.  An insurance agreement such as the ordinary fire 
policy in issue here is not a contract arrived at by negotiation between 
the parties.  The insured is given no choice regarding terms and 
conditions of coverage which are contained on forms which the insured 
seldom sees before purchase of the policy, which often are difficult to 
understand, and which usually are neither read nor expected to be read 
by either the person who sells the policy or the person who buys it.  This 
is not the traditional method by which contracts, including insurance 
contracts, have been made.  The changes which have come into the 
insurance business over the last 50 years reflect the industry’s 
adjustment to modern business conditions and necessities.  The rules 
pertaining to the enforcement of the “bargain” made by the parties 
evolved at a time when the parties negotiated an insurance contract; 
they have little or no relevance to the present methods of transacting 
most insurance business.  This principle is being increasingly 
recognized by the courts.  
Id. at 446 (internal citations omitted).  See also Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 
193, 196 (Pa. 1977) (The court held that prior case law insisting on strict readings of 
insurance contracts “fails to recognize the true nature of the relationship between 
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Reasonable Expectations that limits its application only to the 
insurance context or only to transactions between consumers and 
large, sophisticated entities selling a complex product.69  Indeed, the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations grew out of a more general 
doctrinal orientation that attempted to address core questions at the 
heart of contract law regarding assent, and it represented a response 
 
insurance companies and their insured.  An insurance contract is not a negotiated 
agreement; rather its conditions are by and large dictated by the insurance company to the 
insured.”). 
69 Courts have been reluctant even within the insurance setting to favor policyholders in 
situations where the policyholder is sophisticated and heavily involved in the development 
of the policy language.  This trend suggests that it is not so much the nature of the 
insurance business that drives the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as the fact that 
many insurance coverage cases present prototypical consumer adhesion contracts even if 
the insured is a commercial entity.  The “sophisticated insured” doctrine recognizes that in 
some cases equally sophisticated parties have negotiated the policy terms.  Compare E. 
Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 632  F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(applying Pennsylvania law and declaring that “the principle that ambiguities in policies 
should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the situation where large 
corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a 
negotiated policy.”), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981), and McNeilab, Inc. v. N. River Ins. 
Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 547 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d, 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding 
that contra proferentem could not be applied because the corporate insured was large, 
sophisticated, and aided by counsel in negotiating the policy, which included fifteen 
separate addenda), with Turner & Newall, P.L.C. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 1985 WL 8056 
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1985) (rejecting the interpretation of Eastern Associated and applying 
contra proferentem in a case involving a commercial insured). The Turner Court 
concluded:  
After reviewing the cited authorities, the court finds that it is consistent 
with general authority and Pennsylvania law to construe this provision 
against the insurer if it is found to be ambiguous, because as the drafter 
of the provision, the insurer should bear the risk that when a dispute 
arises over precisely which stockholders are additional insureds and 
under what circumstances, the insurer’s failure to be precise should not 
inure to its benefit. Thus, the better rule, and the one followed in 
Pennsylvania, is to construe against the drafter of an agreement by 
virtue of its control over the words chosen.   
Turner, 1985 WL 8056 at *4.  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the 
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 
807, 849–56 (1993) (surveying the cases and suggesting that commercial parties might still 
receive the benefits of contra proferentem and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 
but that the insured’s sophistication would be taken into account through a number of 
factors such as whether the commercial party participated in the drafting of the policy 
language and whether the party had access to a competitive market for the product and the 
means to appreciate the different coverage terms offered); Swisher, supra note 66, at 737–
40. 
2008] MOOTZ 315 
 
 
 
 
 
to dramatic changes in the manner in which policies were drafted for, 
marketed to, and procured by, insureds.70 
 Karl Llewellyn anticipated that something close to the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations would be a necessary response to the 
breakdown of individualized contracting in the twentieth century with 
the advent of standard form mass contracting.71  Llewellyn did not 
 
70 Protecting reasonable expectations is a central goal of our legal system, even if the 
principle does not provide determinant guidance in particular cases.  For a general 
assessment of this principle, see Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting 
Reasonable Expectations, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 863 (2001).  Kuklin concludes that the 
principle is “a powerful force driving the law” that occupies a “place near the pinnacle of 
legal precepts,” but that it “works poorly as a spotlight when invoked to resolve close legal 
issues.”  Id. at 905.  Thus, the principle will not provide sufficient guidance to resolve 
specific cases, but it can provide a guiding norm in the case-by-case effort to police the 
margins. 
Some might argue that the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is peculiarly suited to 
consumer purchases of insurance, a setting in which it is only contract rights that are 
purchased and these rights are all but incomprehensible to most purchasers.  The aleatory 
nature of the insurance relationship is a relevant difference, but one that imports no 
overriding distinction.  It may be true that a party that purchases goods wants the goods 
and couldn’t care less about the boilerplate contract language, but it is equally true that a 
party that purchases insurance wants to receive a cash payment when it suffers a loss and 
doesn’t really care about the contract language.  Nevertheless, it is true that there is an 
important (and generally unacknowledged) distinction between insurance policies and 
commercial contracts: public policy favors insurance coverage and courts are more willing 
to impose contractual obligations on insurers who already operate in a heavily regulated 
environment.  Even this difference doesn’t undermine the application of the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations to commercial transactions as much as suggest that the contours 
of applying this doctrine will be different in practice. 
71 As Robert Jerry describes, Llewellyn was one of the first thinkers to address the problem 
of adhesion contracts by suggesting something akin to the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations articulated by Keeton in 1970.  Jerry discusses Alan Schwartz’s research: 
which shows that Llewellyn had focused on the link between reasonable 
expectations and standardization at least two decades before [Friedrich 
Kessler’s seminal article in 1943].  In a 1925 article published in the 
American Economic Review, Llewellyn recommended that courts read 
contracts to contain what the weaker party would expect the contract to 
contain, and he used the example of insurance contracts to make his 
point.  Specifically, he advocated giving “the insured . . . the protection 
he might decently believe he was buying, without too close regard to the 
exceptions of the policy.”  In so many words, this was the Keeton 
formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine . . . . 
. . . In his early sales scholarship, Llewellyn considered many of the 
same issues with respect to standardized sales contracts that Keeton 
considered with respect to insurance policies.  Llewellyn urged in no 
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view the Doctrine as an atavistic reaction against standard form 
contracts; to the contrary, he viewed it as a necessary development to 
support the widespread use of standard forms.  In a book review 
published in 1939, he emphasized that standardized forms met a “real 
need,” but that “the presuppositions of our general law no longer 
maintain in such a situation.”72 In his characteristic prose style, 
Llewellyn admitted that judicial competency is limited, but insisted 
that common law judges are well suited to recognize that “where 
bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses to be read into 
a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread 
paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find 
on that paper.”73  Admittedly, attention was focused on consumers 
who should not be bound strictly to all of the terms of an adhesion 
contract.  However, it is important not to forget that Llewellyn was 
equally concerned with businesses that suffered as a result of the 
misguided application of classical contract law principles.  As paper 
 
uncertain terms that plain text in standardized sales contracts should 
be given a meaning that a reasonable consumer would expect in the 
circumstances.  Kessler built upon these same points in his Columbia 
Law Review article.  Almost fifty years after Llewellyn and 
approximately twenty-five years after Kessler, Keeton found evidence 
that courts were reaching exactly that conclusion in the decided 
insurance cases under a wide range of doctrinal theories.  These 
common insights and shared principles should not surprise us; after all, 
insurance policies are but one kind of standardized form.   
Jerry, supra note 41, at 46–47.   
The relative purity of Llewellyn’s vision was muddled in the long effort to secure adoption 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, leading to the need to incorporate more express 
acceptance of “freedom of contract” principles as understood by formalists in the 1950’s.  
Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1949-1954, 
49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001).  This is not to say that Article 2 was stripped of its 
inventiveness entirely:  “Even though the 1957 code was much chastened from what it 
might have been had it been drafted during the 1930s, it was still viewed in some quarters 
as ‘paternalistic’ and a ‘leftist’ attempt to reallocate wealth.”  Curtis Nyquist, Llewellyn’s 
Code as a Reflection of Legal Consciousness, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 419, 421 (2006); Allen 
R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 325, 395 (1995).  Moreover, even 
if Article 2 was somewhat chastened, Llewellyn was not.  As described in the following text, 
Llewellyn held firm to his initial intuitions about standard form contracts. 
72 K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1939) (reviewing O. 
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND 
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)). 
73 Id. at 704. 
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standardized forms came into widespread use, the problem 
confronting businesses was the incompatibility of their battling forms.  
Llewellyn’s statutory innovation to protect businesses engaged in the 
battle of the forms was § 2-207, which ensured both that a contract 
was recognized and that one party would not succeed in having all of 
its terms enforced.  The solution provided by § 2-207 made direct 
judicial enforcement of the parties’ reasonable expectations 
unnecessary because § 2-207 empowered commercial parties to utilize 
competing standard forms as force-fields that effectively protected 
their reasonable expectations. 
 Near the end of his career, Llewellyn offered his much-cited, but 
too infrequently examined, thesis of “blanket assent” to ensure the 
protection of reasonable expectations.  In his magisterial book, The 
Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, Llewellyn discusses the 
problem created by enforcing standard form contracts in the course of 
explaining how judges and scholars work to adjust the law to changing 
social circumstances.74  Llewellyn first acknowledges that standard 
form contracts play a vital role in a modern economy.75  Indeed, he 
goes so far as to suggest that standard form agreements that emerge 
from balanced negotiations within an industry should be enforced by 
courts in recognition that these form agreements provide “the road to 
better than official-legal regulation of our economic life; indeed, they 
tend to lead into the setting up of their own quick, cheap, expert 
tribunals.”76  Llewellyn was an economic realist who understood the 
need for order and dependability in a well-functioning commercial 
market. 
 But Llewellyn also understood that the private power conferred on 
commercial parties by classical contract doctrine could be abused to 
the detriment of those people who assume that they are placing their 
heads in the mouth of a “sweet and gentle lion.”77  Llewellyn noted 
 
74 Llewellyn argues that boilerplate agreements are an example of how “the clan of legal 
scholars and the tribe of appellate judges are allies willy-nilly in the Herculean labor of 
producing and expanding order in our legal doctrine . . . .”  LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 
361–62. 
75 Llewellyn suggests that form agreements with sweeping clauses protect businesses from 
excessive risks (he cites the problem of the seed company defending itself in front of a jury 
of farmers in a case involving a farmer’s loss of an entire crop) and suggests that it might 
make sense simply to bar all claims so as to permit a fair-minded company to create 
exceptions for contracting partners who raise meritorious claims.  Id. at 363.  
76 Id. 
77 Llewellyn captures the situation in his familiar prose style:  
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that broad clauses in the drafter’s favor are sometimes written in a 
manner that confers too much discretion, which is problematic for the 
simple reason that not all companies are gentle lions, and even sweet 
lions can make mistakes sometimes.78  The classical common law 
courts approached the problem in a wholly unrealistic manner, 
Llewellyn argued, because they unpredictably read the form 
agreement literally, in a bow to freedom of contract, and then later in 
their analysis they unpredictably refused to enforce terms they 
deemed to be “indecent.”79  Citing Dawson’s comparative analysis of 
the German system, and his own book review of a text on English and 
continental law, Llewellyn argued that scholars were only beginning to 
point the way to a realistic approach to standard form agreements.80 
 Llewellyn’s famous response to the challenge presented by 
standard form agreements was to recognize that assent had become a 
two-tiered reality.  When a party is presented with a standard form 
agreement: 
[T]he boiler-plate is assented to en bloc, “unsight, unseen,” 
on the implicit assumption and to the full extent that (1) it 
does not alter or impair the fair meaning of the dickered 
terms when read alone, and (2) that its terms are neither in 
the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and 
unfair.  Such is the reality, and I see nothing in the way of a 
court’s operating on that basis, to truly effectuate the only 
intention which can in reason be worked out as common to 
the two parties, granted good faith.  And if the boiler-plate 
party is not playing in good faith, there is law enough to bar 
that fact from benefiting it.  We had a hundred years of sales 
law in which any sales transaction with explicit words 
 
Power, like greed, if it does not always corrupt, goes easily to the head.  
So that form-agreements tend either at once or over the years, and often 
by whole lines of trade, into a massive and almost terrifying jug-
handled character; the one party lays his head into the mouth of a lion–
either, and mostly, without reading the fine print, or occasionally in 
hope and expectation (not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and 
gentle lion. 
Id. at 362. 
78 Id. at 362. 
79 Id. at 364–65. 
80 Id. at 365–66. 
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resulted in two several contracts for the one consideration: 
that of sale, and the collateral one of warranty.  The idea is 
applicable here, for better reason: any contract with boiler-
plate results in two several contracts: the dickered deal, and 
the collateral one of supplementary boilerplate.  Rooted in 
sense, history, and simplicity, it is an answer which could 
occur to anyone.81 
Llewellyn argued that commentators and courts would converge on 
the theory of blanket assent as the best interpretation of contract law 
in light of modern economic conditions.82 
 
81 Id. at 371.  As one commentator explains,  
[Llewellyn’s] theory provides both a rationale for upholding most 
standard-form contracts–at least insofar as they are not unreasonable 
or indecent–and also an understanding of what is actually going on in 
the customer’s mind. . . . If the term is central to the agreement—a 
dickered or negotiated term in Llewellyn’s parlance—then it will be 
given wide deference.  On the other hand where the terms are not 
negotiated and are peripheral to the basic agreement, then, in fairness, 
the court should take a closer look, if only because the imbalance of 
power between the parties means that the term will, in all likelihood, 
have been drafted in a manner most favorable to the drafting party.  If 
so, and the resulting term is either ‘unreasonable’ or ‘indecent,’ the 
court can find that there was no actual assent and refuse to enforce the 
term.  The court, through this kind of scrutiny, can ensure that the 
overall contract remains balanced. 
Oakley, supra note 65, at 1054–55. 
82 Llewellyn noted that the theory of blanket assent would not protect a party who has read 
and expressly manifested assent to an indecent clause, but he suggested that these rare 
cases could be handled by a bit of slight-of-hand. 
The one case in a thousand where the dirty clauses have been read and 
truly agreed to can, for my money, be discarded both as de minimus 
and to keep that issue from disturbing all the litigation to which it is in 
fact irrelevant.  The common law technique, when the facts run so 
profusely in a single direction, would be a simple “conclusive 
presumption”–that boiler-plate has not been read.   
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 391.  Llewellyn’s uncharacteristic use of a “covert tool” may 
have been a prescient suggestion for how to deal with the increasingly specific means by 
which click-through agreements are reached, such as requiring the party to check 
individual paragraphs, to scroll through the entire list of terms before clicking “I agree,” 
etc.  
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 As we transition to a single electronic form with terms that are 
present only virtually, the time is ripe to consider whether some form 
of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations makes sense even in non-
consumer contexts.  To borrow Professor Jerry’s phrase, to do so 
would be to launch a major offensive in the battle for the soul of 
contract law.83  Admittedly, this assault might prove to be the Pickett’s 
Charge of legal functionalism, resulting in a decisive victory for 
formalists.  But, this may be the best and most honest response to the 
looming irrelevance of § 2-207. 
 It is important to emphasize that I am arguing in favor of judicial 
efforts to police the margins of contracting by commercial parties by 
reinvigorating the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations.  The failed 
effort to amend Article 2 has many facets, but certainly the initial draft 
 
83 Jerry’s prose is worth quoting at length: 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, courts and scholars have 
battled for the soul of contract law.  On one side are the formalists or 
classicists, whose champions are Professor Williston and the first 
Restatement of Contracts.  The formalists care mightily about texts and 
the four corners of documents. . . . 
. . .  
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the 
functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the 
realists, or the post-classicists.  The champions of this side are Professor 
Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. . . . Where a form is 
standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable 
expectations for whatever the particular recipient of the form 
understood, given that the recipient has less reason to know what the 
drafter means, while the drafter has insights into what the ordinary, 
reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand.  In the 
functionalists’ world, Judge Keeton’s doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is far from threatening.  Indeed insurance law’s doctrine of 
reasonable expectation simply restates for insurance lawyers what 
contract law is (or should be) saying to all lawyers. 
. . .  
This means that Judge Keeton’s article is not just about insurance law; 
it speaks to consumers and businesses in any industry where 
standardized forms are used.  Thus, the debate over reasonable 
expectations is not just an insurance law debate.  It is a contract law 
debate, and the prize to the winner is ownership of a major piece of the 
soul of contract law. 
Jerry, supra note 41, at 55–56. 
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providing consumer protection modeled on the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations was controversial and drew the ire of industry.  As 
Braucher advises, this experience suggests that uniform regulatory 
approaches to this problem are not likely to succeed politically and, in 
fact, may be counterproductive in light of the need for 
experimentation and attention to context.84  Even if large consumer 
 
84 Braucher writes: 
An obvious way to attempt to reduce political objection to special 
policing of SFKs [standard form contracts] is to limit the category to 
which heightened policing applies.  Limitations to consumer contracts  
. . . is the narrowest strategy of this type, but even that focus has proved 
controversial in the UCC revision process.  For example, the Article 2 
revision project initially undertook to make a version of the common 
law “reasonable expectations” doctrine (making terms contrary to 
reasonable expectations unenforceable) explicitly applicable to sales of 
goods to consumers.  However, even with a narrow focus on consumer 
contracts, the effort was beaten back and eventually abandoned by the 
Article 2 drafting committee.  In the face of political deadlock in the 
uniform laws process, it may be time to think about nonuniform state 
law as a vehicle to begin experimentation with new and more effective 
methods of policing SFKS. 
Braucher, supra note 27, at 417–18. 
The original Reporter for the Article 2 revision process, Richard Speidel, describes how 
strong sellers “beat back” the attempt to expressly include the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations on behalf of consumers by convincing the NCCUSL leadership that they 
would block enactment of Revised Article 2.  Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A 
View From the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 610 (2001).  He suggests that the reason 
the original draft was “hung out to dry” leaving “protection for consumers and small 
businesses . . . to section 2-302 and the comments,” was that the “strong sellers” were 
content with existing Article 2: “Limited only by the porous doctrines of unconscionability 
and good faith, strong sellers are able to shape the contract to fit their interests, 
particularly where small business and consumers were involved.”  Id. at 616, 618. 
All this leads me to conclude that the courts, whatever their drawbacks, will have to 
provide the solution to problems that arise after the battle of the forms has ended.  
Uniform regulation is now all but unthinkable, and state-by-state regulatory reform is 
certain to confront the same unified opposition that stymied efforts to revise Article 2. 
Clayton Gillette’s recent hypothesis that protecting consumers from abusive rolling 
contracts is best accomplished not by relying solely on market constraints, but also by ex 
ante supervision of contract terms by regulators and ex post regulation by courts, while 
carefully argued and fairly noting the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism, 
would seem to be unrealistic in the present environment.  See Gillette, supra note 36, at 
722 (admitting that no third-party “agent” will be a perfect surrogate for the contracting 
party, but arguing that a judicious mix of all three mechanisms is probably desirable).   
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goods manufacturers were justified in their fear that statutory 
recognition of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations on behalf of 
consumers would amount to a formless and unpredictable rule,85 the 
 
In contrast, Robert Oakley concludes that courts currently apply an unconscionability 
standard that is more demanding than Llewellyn’s test and that the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations holds no great promise outside the context of insurance law, Oakley, supra 
note 65, at 1056, 1065 but his suggestion that consumer protection legislation be enacted 
based on the E.U. Directive on Unfair Contract Terms (Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts) and the “Stop Before You Click” 
principles developed by the Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions with 
respect to the licensing of computer information,  id. at 1065–71, 1071–1100, appears even 
more unlikely to address the problem. 
Perhaps well-defined rules for the consumer sector might be successfully enacted in some 
states (e.g., you can’t require a consumer to arbitrate a $500 dispute in a distant locale), 
but any such reforms will almost certainly not extend to the commercial parties that are the 
focus of this article. 
85 In early drafts of Revised Article 2, the drafting committee incorporated the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine to deal with standard form contracts presented to consumers.  The 
draft presented for discussion at the NCCUSL 1996 Annual Meeting included the following: 
SECTION 2-206. STANDARD FORM RECORDS. 
(a) If all of the terms of a contract are contained in a record which is a 
standard form or contains standard terms and the party who did not 
prepare the record manifests assent to it by a signature or other 
conduct, that party adopts all terms contained in record as part of the 
contract except those terms that are unconscionable. 
(b) A term in a record which is a standard form or which contains 
standard terms to which a consumer has manifested assent by a 
signature or other conduct is not part of the contract if the consumer 
could not reasonably have expected it unless the consumer expressly 
agrees to the term. In determining whether a term is part of the 
contract, the court shall consider the content, language, and 
presentation of the standard form or standard term. 
(c) A term adopted under subsection (a) becomes part of the contract 
without regard to the knowledge or understanding of individual terms 
by the party assenting to the standard form record, whether or not the 
party read the form. 
Uniform Commercial Code, National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc2sale.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).  This 
approach was altered substantially.  The March 1, 1999, draft of Revised Article 2 read as 
follows: 
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situation is different when considering transactions between 
businesses that were formerly concluded with a battle of forms.  In 
commercial transactions, there are more well-defined notions of 
unacceptable business contracting practices that can inform the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as a means for policing the 
fringes.86  In defending the notion of “blanket assent,” Llewellyn 
admitted that a statutory solution to the problem of policing terms is 
“likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in 
scope”87; for this reason judicial enforcement of reasonable 
expectations provides the best mechanism for adjusting the law to 
modern social and economic reality, at least in the first instance.88  In 
 
SECTION 2-206. UNENFORCEABLE TERMS IN CONSUMER 
CONTRACTS. 
(a) In a consumer contract, a court may refuse to enforce a standard 
term in a record the inclusion of which was materially inconsistent with 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in contracts of that 
type, or, subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with one or more 
nonstandard terms in the record. 
(b) If it is claimed or appears to the court that any term of a consumer 
contract may be unenforceable, the parties, to aid the court in making 
the determination, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to the term’s commercial setting, purpose, and 
effect or as to whether it was consistent with reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in contracts of that type. 
(c) This section does not apply to a term disclaiming or modifying an 
implied warranty that complies with Section 2-406. 
Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2–Sales, National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ 
ucc2399.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).  Ultimately, as finally adopted, Amended Article 2 
contains no element of consumer protection specifically with regard to standard form 
agreements. 
86 Article 2 is built on this assumption, with “reasonable commercial practices” providing 
much of the guidance in the statutory provisions.  Although we might debate the extent to 
which trade usage is sufficiently definite to provide terms of the parties’ contract, there is 
far more likelihood that business mores, as revealed through expert testimony and careful 
attention to the facts of the case, will sufficiently identify extreme, unacceptable 
contracting behavior on the fringes of commercial practice. 
87 LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 370. 
88 Llewellyn’s famous lectures in German on the case law system in America discuss the 
how the interaction of case law precedent and the formulation of statutes can be 
maximized: 
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the remainder of this article, I analyze how courts can utilize the 
existing Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations for the limited purpose 
of ensuring that commercial contracting retains its integrity after the 
demise of the battle of the forms.  
1.  THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
 The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is embodied in § 211 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which pertains to the 
interpretation of standard form contracts generally, and is not limited 
to consumer contexts.89  Indeed, Restatement § 211 reflects the 
 
At the [start of developing new law], both the insight and experience 
necessary to create a statute are lacking.  A statute passed under such 
circumstances is a far greater misfortune than any misstep taken by a 
case law court.  But if enough cases are available, if enough experience 
has been amassed to make an incisive diagnosis possible, a statute can 
more much more directly and efficiently toward its real goal than the 
pure tradition-bound case law method.  Once a statute is adopted, 
though, there is room again for the case law method, for only through it 
can legislative insight be elaborated, corrected, and perfected in light of 
the subsequent, unforeseen cases.  Optimally, a statute will create a new 
goal and a new means to achieve it, but never the ultimate 
particularized solution which is finally achieved—knowingly or 
unknowingly, admitted or kept under wraps—only through judicial 
decision. 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 67 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi 
trans., 1989) (1933).  Given the inability to craft a satisfactory uniform law solution to the 
problem, Llewellyn would undoubtedly urge courts to develop case law that could serve as 
the resource for an eventual statutory scheme.  This appears to be the path followed by the 
German courts and legislature.  See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
89 The provision reads as follows: 
§ 211.  Standardized Agreements 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement 
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to 
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of 
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated 
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike 
all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or 
understanding of the standard terms of the writing. 
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broader principle broached by Llewellyn, and then developed 
principally in the insurance context.90  Section 211 provides a 
relatively simple framework for effectuating the terms of a form 
agreement.  A party is bound to the terms of a standard form when it 
manifests assent with the knowledge that such a form regularly 
embodies terms of the agreement, but the terms are interpreted in an 
objective manner (“treating alike all those similarly situated, without 
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms”).91  
However, the reasonable expectations of the party assenting to the 
form may trump the terms as written when the offering party “has 
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do 
so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term.”92  This 
carefully worded exception ensures that the reasonable expectations 
of both parties are honored.  Comment (f) provides the rationale for 
this rule: 
Although customers typically adhere to standardized 
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing 
to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to 
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1980).  Recent cases applying Restatement  
§ 211 in non-insurance disputes include: Harrington v. Pulte Home Corp., 119 P.3d 1044, 
1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an arbitration clause in a home construction 
contract did not violate reasonable expectations); Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix, 
Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that an arbitration clause was not 
enforceable in a case involving physical injury, where the patient, in a state of emotional 
upset, signed a contract containing an arbitration clause requiring that a doctor of the 
same specialty as the defendant serve as the arbitrator); and cases cited in note 93, infra.  
90 See Friedman, supra note 12, at 41 (characterizing § 211 as embodying Llewellyn’s 
approach).  Llewellyn expressly drew from the same insurance cases that formed the basis 
of Keeton’s article, arguing that the theory of blanket assent was used by courts in 
situations where the fine print followed the contracting (such as the purchase of an 
insurance policy), but that the theory was equally applicable to all form agreements.  
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 370.  
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1), (2).  This rule recognizes that the point 
of a standard form is that it is not intended to be read, but rather is accepted by parties that 
“trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the tacit representation that like 
terms are being accepted regularly by others similarly situated.”  Id. at cmt. b. 
92 Id. § 211(3). 
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expectation. [The offering party’s reason to believe that the 
term would not be acceptable] may be shown by the prior 
negotiations or inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre 
or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it 
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.  The 
inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an 
opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise 
hidden from view.93 
This rule and rationale provide a reasoned and balanced starting point 
for developing a solution to the problems that might arise between 
commercial parties who have executed contracts in a click-wrap 
world. 
 It is important to emphasize that the use of the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in connection with click-wrap adhesion 
contracts does not mean that a party can easily trump terms to which 
it ostensibly has manifested agreement.  Under the formulation of 
Restatement § 211, terms contained in a standardized form to which 
assent has formally been expressed by clicking “I agree” shall be 
interpreted objectively, and will govern the transaction unless the 
offering party “has reason to believe that the party manifesting such 
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a 
particular term.”94  However, attempting to restrict the scope of the 
Doctrine by permitting courts to override a term only when it is so 
 
93 Id. § 211, cmt. f.  Some states use a version of this language to flesh out the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in insurance coverage cases.  A leading case, C&J Fertilizer, Inc. 
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169, 174–76 (Iowa 1975) (en banc), expressly drew 
from Llewellyn’s notion of blanket assent and comment f to Restatement § 211 to formulate 
a general rule respecting reasonable expectations that could be applied to the insurance 
policy in question.  See also Clark-Peterson Co. v. Ind. Ins. Assoc., 492 N.W.2d 675, 677 
(Iowa 1992) (en banc): 
Originating with Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973), the doctrine has become a vital 
part of our law interpreting insurance policies.  But the doctrine does 
not contemplate the expansion of insurance coverage on a general 
equitable basis.  The doctrine is carefully circumscribed; it can only be 
invoked where an exclusion “(1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates 
terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the 
transaction.” Aid (Mut.) Ins. v. Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Iowa 
1988); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112 
(Iowa 1981). 
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 211 (3). 
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odious that the courts can conclude counter-factually that the 
customer would have withheld assent altogether had it known about 
the term provides only a veneer of restraint and objectivity.   
 Courts are likely to find that adjudication is more predictable if 
they articulate the Doctrine based on the underlying principles, rather 
than a pretense of counter-factual analysis.  Stated in a more 
forthright and realistic manner, a commercial party should be able to 
seek relief from the literal terms of a standard form click-wrap 
agreement only when the term in question is objectively surprising to 
that party in circumstances where the seller should have known that 
the term would not be acceptable.95  The fact that the party seeking 
relief is a commercial party rather than a consumer should be relevant 
to determining which expectations are “reasonable,” but the non-
consumer nature of the transaction should not preclude the 
application of the Doctrine.96 
 
95 With reference to consumer contracts, Russell Korobkin has recently argued that the 
formulation of Restatement § 211 is not helpful because it is at once too demanding (by 
focusing on truly outrageous terms that undermine assent altogether) and too lenient (by 
focusing on the circumstances of the individual buyer rather adopting a more objective 
analysis of the class of similarly situated buyers).  Korobkin, supra note 26, at 1270.  
Korobkin suggests that the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations would be better suited to 
the task, but concludes that it has fallen into desuetude outside the insurance coverage 
context.  Id. at 1270–71.  Korobkin responds by reconceptualizing the unconscionability 
defense to deal with the effects of bounded rationality on consumer transactions involving 
standard form agreements, id. at 1278–90, but that is not a plausible strategy for the 
commercial sphere.  Thus, in this article I attempt to articulate how the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations can be resuscitated in the context of commercial transactions 
concluded by electronic means. 
96 In recent years, some courts have used the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as an 
interpretive principle to protect consumers from over-reaching literalist interpretations of 
standard-form contract language by preventing credit card companies from adding 
arbitration agreements to the governing terms and conditions pursuant to a broad clause 
in the original agreement that purports to permit the company to amend the agreement 
after providing notice of the change and an opportunity to opt out.  See Perry v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2004 WL 1508518 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004) (holding that a card 
issuer’s attempt to add an arbitration clause to the terms of use by invoking a clause that 
permitted modification by the card issuer was contrary to the card holder’s reasonable 
expectations); Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (same); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 432 (N.C. App. 2004) 
(applying Arizona law) (“A customer would not expect that a major corporation could 
choose to disregard potential contractual opportunities and then later, if it changed its 
mind, impose them on the customer unilaterally.”);  Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Cal. App. 1998) (deciding the matter on principles of contract 
interpretation).  It stands to reason that a small business using a corporate credit card 
might successfully make a similar argument under certain circumstances, whereas a huge 
corporation that annually negotiates its corporate credit card agreement might not.  The 
question should not be decided solely on the basis of the party’s status as a commercial 
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 If our hypothetical tennis entrepreneur finds that her click-wrap 
agreement to purchase goods from a manufacturer eviscerates her 
ability to seek redress for breach through a series of provisions 
regarding mandatory notice of claims, an inconvenient venue for 
pursuing claims, and a mandatory arbitration process that renders 
seeking relief pointless, it is entirely appropriate that a court consider 
whether the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations should provide 
some manner of relief.  Having lost the ability to deploy the § 2-207 
force-field, and in response to a contracting process that intensifies 
the adhesive character of the transaction to new levels, the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations can provide a balanced and context-sensitive 
means for courts to ensure the integrity of the contract as the “bargain 
in fact” of the parties, rather than as a formalistic concealed weapon 
that can be unsheathed abruptly by the superior party.97 
 
entity, but rather with regard for the reasonable expectations of the parties to the 
commercial contract. 
Of course, even consumers would be bound to arbitrate disputes pursuant to an 
amendment to their credit card agreement under circumstances that suggest that this type 
of amendment was to be reasonably expected, or that the amendment process more closely 
conforms to a genuine bilateral modification.  The court cases mentioned above will likely 
reinforce contracting practices that are not overreaching and that courts will be inclined to 
find enforceable.  See, e.g., Beneficial Nat. Bank, U.S.A. v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 687 
(S.D. Miss. 2001) (distinguishing Badie because cardholder was given the opportunity to 
reject the proposed amendment providing for arbitration of disputes and to continue with 
the current agreement); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 829 (S.D. Miss. 
2001) (same). 
This analysis can be rendered more sophisticated by drawing back from the individual 
contract and considering the effect of the arbitration clause when it precludes a class action 
in situations where a class action is the only viable means of imposing ex post 
accountability.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 173 (2006) (“Every indication is that the imposed arbitration clauses 
are nothing but a shield against legal accountability by the credit card companies.”).  It is 
not a stretch to suggest that parties have a reasonable expectation that there will be some 
plausible method to assert a claim, and so an arbitration clause designed in part to 
preclude effective review would properly be subject to judicial scrutiny.  In the consumer 
setting the doctrine of unconscionability provides courts with an additional tool with which 
to reinforce reasonable expectations, especially under the broader rule in California.  Id. at 
178–80 (discussing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 85–86 (Cal. 
2005)); see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Acorn v. Household 
Int’l, Inc. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. App. 2002). 
97 Article 1 defines “agreement” as the “bargain in fact of the parties,” reflecting the 
jurisprudence of legal realism that pervades the jurisprudence of Article 2.  U.C.C. § 1-
201(a)(3) (2006). 
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 Consider a more detailed exploration of this hypothetical.  Assume 
that the tennis entrepreneur electronically orders ten racquets from a 
manufacturer that has production and distribution facilities around 
the world.  The click-wrap contract contains a number of terms, 
including a non-disparagement clause and a dispute resolution 
provision that obligates the buyer to arbitrate any disputes in 
Switzerland (the location of the manufacturer’s world headquarters) 
under the ICC rules, although the seller retains its right to summary 
process and repossession in the event of nonpayment.  We can assume 
that the seller has selected these terms in the rational pursuit of its 
business objectives rather than for the purpose of causing harm to its 
buyers.  We can also assume that the court would find that the 
electronic contract is valid and binding.  With respect to the specific 
terms, the doctrine of unconscionability would almost certainly have 
no application to this commercial contract.  The question is whether 
courts should be empowered to enforce the agreement without 
enforcing some of the specific terms. 
 The non-disparagement clause would be construed within the 
commercial setting, including the business purposes served by the 
clause and its effect on the buyer.  It might be perfectly reasonable for 
all commercial purchasers to expect that they would become agents of 
the manufacturer in dealing with consumers, and that it is reasonable 
to expect that their business relationship is founded on the buyer’s 
express commitment to endorse the seller’s products.  The test of 
reasonable expectations—whether the term in question is objectively 
surprising to the buyer in circumstances where the seller should have 
known that the term would not be acceptable—would necessarily be 
fact-intensive, but also objective in character.  It is helpful to analogize 
to the merchant definition of Article 2 to clarify the “objective” 
character of the analysis.  Parties are treated as merchants under 
Article 2 because they hold themselves out to the world as having 
particular knowledge or skill (whether by dealing in the goods or 
otherwise), not because they actually have specialized knowledge or 
skill.98  In analogous fashion, the tennis entrepreneur may honestly be 
surprised to discover the full contours of the business context in which 
 
98 Article 2 defines “merchant” as “a person, that deals in goods of the kind or otherwise 
holds itself out by occupation as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or 
goods involved in the transaction . . .” thereby making clear that dealing in goods is only 
one way to hold oneself out to the world as a merchant.  U.C.C. § 2-104 (1) (2000).  The 
functional, rather than ontological, character of the definition is reinforced by subsection 
(3), which provides that a contract is between merchants when “both parties are chargeable 
with the knowledge or skill of merchants.”  U.C.C. § 2-104 (3) (2000). 
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she is dealing, but this fact alone would not be the basis for avoiding 
the import of contract terms to which she nominally assented by click-
wrap contracting. 
 On the other hand, a dispute resolution provision that can be 
shown to preclude any effective remedy for breach in virtually every 
likely scenario that might arise between the parties should be highly 
suspect.  The seller might have ample justification for the provision 
based on numerous contracts with large, multinational purchasers, 
but this justification does not apply in the context of the class of buyer 
in this hypothetical.  One would expect that in virtually all cases of a 
dispute regarding ten racquets, the seller would resolve the dispute 
informally or at least would not insist on enforcing patently unrealistic 
and unfair terms to govern a formal resolution of the dispute.   
 To the extent that the seller sought to enforce the dispute 
resolution term as written, a court might find good reason to conclude 
that the term in question is objectively surprising to the buyer in 
circumstances where the seller should have known that the term 
would not be acceptable.  This result would not necessarily introduce 
unacceptable uncertainty into the contractual relationship.  If the 
seller wishes to reduce uncertainty about such matters, it can easily 
calibrate its dispute resolution term to avoid objectively unreasonable 
features.  For example, by providing different procedures and a 
different venue according to the amount in controversy, a seller could 
offer an objectively reasonable dispute resolution term that would be 
enforced as written.  Surely it is not asking too much for a seller to 
offer a different approach to dispute resolution to a small buyer 
claiming $150 in damages than it would offer to a large buyer that 
claims $1 million in damages. 
 Determining whether a term was reasonably expected by the 
parties in light of the commercial circumstances does not require the 
court to undertake an inquiry that differs radically from the rule under 
§ 2-207(2), which requires the determination of the terms of an 
agreement when there is a battle of the forms.  If commercial parties 
exchange nonidentical forms to conclude or confirm an agreement, 
terms that appear on only one of the forms become part of the 
agreement unless, among other criteria, “they materially alter” the 
agreement.99  The Official Comments make clear that this 
determination amounts to an inquiry into the objective reasonable 
expectations of the parties by suggesting that the rule seeks to 
determine whether the additional terms would “result in surprise or 
 
99 U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2000). 
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hardship if incorporated without express awareness,” or they “involve 
no element of unreasonable surprise.”100  This is not to suggest that 
courts should apply this precise test to a single form in the electronic 
environment, but rather to emphasize that courts currently are bound 
to make judgments about the reasonable expectations of commercial 
parties engaged in a battle of the forms. 
2.  ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE  
OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
 Critics generally will argue that applying the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations to sales of goods will undermine the offering 
party’s ability to proceed with confidence on the basis of its desired 
terms and conditions, but this criticism misses the point that the very 
nature of a claim under the Doctrine is that the offering party had no 
reasonable basis to assume that its offered terms would be genuinely 
accepted by the other party.  A party that is advised by its lawyer that 
the standard terms in its form agreement should eviscerate the other 
party’s right to seek redress for breach of other terms of the agreement 
has no legitimate basis for disappointment if the courts refuse to 
enforce these terms.  In the far more likely scenario where the offering 
party has only a vague notion that its lawyer has drafted highly 
favorable terms to protect it in the event of a dispute, this party suffers 
no harm if a court construes the form to be enforceable only along 
lines that more closely resemble what reasonable commercial parties 
might expect if the agreement had been fully negotiated.101 
 
100 U.C.C. § 2-207, cmts. 4, 5 (2000). 
101 Commentators have argued that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are too 
permissive in these contexts, essentially permitting lawyers to draft oppressive clauses on 
behalf of their clients.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 361 (2002).  Carrington opens his article with a strong statement:  
Lawyers writing standard form contracts for clients to use in recording 
transactions with parties not represented by counsel have a professional 
duty to restrain their zeal.  It is my impression that many lawyers are 
unaware of such a duty.  As a consequence, many cause injustice and 
expose themselves and their firms not only to such appropriate moral 
sanctions as the contempt of fellow citizens and other lawyers, but also 
to some risks of tort liability and professional discipline.  
Id. at 361.  But Carrington ultimately concludes with regret that “no language in the text of 
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct appears explicitly to authorize professional 
discipline on lawyers who write unconscionable contracts.”  Id. at 380. 
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 The critique might be sharpened and refined, with critics insisting 
that the very essence of standard form agreements is to ensure 
certainty regarding the enforceable rights and obligations of both 
parties across a wide variety of transaction partners.  Because it is 
impossible for the offering party to conduct a fact-specific inquiry 
(even of objective elements) ex ante without eliminating the 
efficiencies of the standard terms, the offering party cannot know 
whether its standard terms will be enforceable in a given transaction.  
Returning to the hypothetical, critics would argue that a tennis 
racquet manufacturer that deals both with large wholesalers and small 
resellers will be subjected to an uncertain application of its click-wrap 
terms if courts are empowered to find that some of the terms are 
enforceable with respect to the former but not the latter.  However, 
this critique remains unpersuasive.   
 First, it is important to reemphasize the objective nature of the 
inquiry under the Doctrine, which means that it would be relatively 
easy for the party to calibrate its terms to relevant objective factors so 
as to achieve a higher degree of certainty.  Moreover, the offering 
party could present different standard terms to different classes of 
buyers by using different web applications.  This already occurs when 
sellers seek to differentiate consumer orders from commercial orders 
by utilizing different web interfaces, including restricted access 
intranet pages.  Large commercial buyers might pre-register to gain 
access to a non-Internet-based application that would have 
corresponding terms for the particular class of buyer.  Of course, if 
critics are concerned that the offering party will not be able to secure 
all of the terms it desires in all of its transactions, this is just to return 
to the debate over the soul of contract: the entire point of the Doctrine 
of Reasonable Expectations is to deny the ability of one commercial 
party to secure enforcement of all manner of terms it desires against 
another commercial party, unless that party secures genuine assent. 
 
A recent article argues that the anti-fraud provisions of Rules 1.2, 4.1 and 8.4 permit a 
more robust restatement of the obligations imposed on lawyers drafting form agreements, 
concluding that these rules “provide a powerful set of proscriptions against lawyers who 
intentionally draft or negotiate invalid clauses, fail to advise a client of an invalid or iffy 
clause, or misrepresent the validity of a clause to a client or another party or person.  Rule 
2.1 furnishes some compelling reasons why lawyers should counsel their clients more 
broadly than on legal considerations alone.  These rules, however, do not prevent a lawyer 
from skillfully drafting a clause that is ‘close to the edge, but not over,’ as long as the lawyer 
has a good-faith argument as to the clause’s validity, supported by a good-faith belief. ” 
Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. 
REV. 487, 510 (2006).  
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 It is important to emphasize that when a commercial party enters 
into a contract with knowledge of the terms and their implications, the 
court should enforce those terms and the Doctrine will have no 
relevance.  In their study of contracts between automobile 
manufacturers and tier-1 suppliers, Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. 
White describe the harsh, one-sided terms (including unilateral 
termination clauses that are essentially unrestricted) that the 
suppliers are required to accept in order to do business with the 
manufacturers.102  These standard terms are nonnegotiable, relatively 
long-standing, and understood by the suppliers; consequently, they 
should be enforced except in extreme (and extremely unlikely) 
circumstances that would probably best be characterized as bad faith 
enforcement of an otherwise legitimate contract right.  The 
manufacturers do not permit a “battle of the forms” that would vary 
their standard terms; instead, they insist on an express agreement to 
their one-sided standard terms.103 
 In such (unusual) circumstances, the use of electronic contracting 
would not change the analysis.  Just as a party today may avoid the 
“reasonable expectations” rule of § 2-207 by insisting on an express 
agreement to all of its one-sided terms, a party would be able to secure 
actual assent to all of its terms in the electronic contracting 
environment.  My point is that courts are wrong to conclude that 
simply utilizing click-wrap contracting allows the parties to reach this 
result.  The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations should fill the gap 
left after the battle of the forms has ended; however, this does not 
mean that the Doctrine should supplant genuine express agreements 
to standard terms, even if they are one-sided. 
 This line of reasoning invites us to return to the starting, and 
sticking, point.  The thesis of this article is that when a commercial 
party clicks “I agree,” it is not necessarily equivalent to the tier-1 
manufacturer agreeing to General Motor’s well-known and 
understood standard terms.  Put plainly, it is a mistake to conclude 
that the elimination of the battle of the forms in electronic contracting 
is equivalent to the insistence of General Motors that it receive its 
standard terms by refusing to engage in the battle of the forms.  The 
technology of electronic assent reflects greater degrees of organization 
and efficiency, but does not always reflect a higher degree of actual 
assent.  The literature regarding consumer transactions suggests that 
 
102 Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto 
Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006). 
103 Id. at 967–68. 
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assent is actually weakened in the electronic environment.104  It 
stands to reason that, if true, this dynamic would also hold true at 
least for some commercial parties such as the tennis entrepreneur.  
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations might be difficult to deploy 
in consumer settings, and may be largely duplicative of other doctrinal 
and statutory protections, but the Doctrine can be deployed in a 
predictable manner in the commercial setting to fill the void as  
§ 2-207 becomes irrelevant.  This approach would also forestall any 
tendency of courts to question the “blanket assent” reflected in the 
electronic contracting process as the means for policing unacceptable 
terms.  In this sense, the Doctrine would ensure recognition of the 
existence of a bargain and thereby facilitate electronic contracting. 
 Courts should employ the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as 
a feature of general contract law that reaffirms the principles 
underlying the recognition and enforcement of consensual 
obligations.  The Supreme Court of Arizona, sitting en banc, 
responded to the then newly drafted Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts by emphasizing that developing the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations as a general feature of contract law, rather than solely as 
a safety valve to benefit insurance policyholders, simultaneously 
ensures the integrity of the Doctrine and maintains the certainty of 
contract relations.  The court began by noting that confining judicial 
review to a literal textual analysis of adhesion form contracts is no 
longer plausible: “At best, such reasoning, based on patently 
unfounded assumptions of intent, is result oriented; at worst, it makes 
no sense.”105  Baldly stated, the Doctrine “is quite troublesome, since 
most insureds develop a ‘reasonable expectation’ that every loss will 
be covered by their policy,” but the court found suitable grounding for 
the Doctrine in the conceptual work of Llewellyn and Corbin, as 
reflected in Restatement § 211.106 
This treatment of insurance law is neither radical nor new.  
All that is new in the “changed” Restatement is the 
articulation of the rule. . . .  
 
104 See supra note 26. 
105 Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 393–94 
(Ariz. 1984) (en banc). 
106 Id. at 395. 
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In adopting this rule, we do not create a special field of 
contract law, we merely adopt a rule of integration [of the 
agreement in written form] which recognizes the method by 
which people do business. . . .  
The rule adopted today recognizes reality and the needs of 
commerce; it allows businesses that use such forms to write 
their own contract.  It charges the customer with knowledge 
that the contract being “purchased” is or contains a form 
applied to a vast number of transactions and includes terms 
which are unknown (or even unknowable); it binds the 
customer to such terms.  However, the rule stops short of 
granting the drafter of the contract license to accomplish any 
result.  It holds the drafter to good faith and terms which are 
conscionable; it requires drafting of provisions which can be 
understood if the customer does attempt to check on his 
rights; it does not give effect to boilerplate terms which are 
contrary to either the expressed agreement or the purpose of 
the transaction as known to the contracting parties.  From 
the standpoint of the judicial system, the rule recognizes the 
true origin of standardized contract provisions, frees the 
courts from having to write a contract for the parties, and 
removes the temptation to create ambiguity or invent intent 
in order to reach a result. . . . 
To apply the old rule and interpret such contracts according 
to the imagined intent of the parties is to perpetuate a fiction 
which can do no more than bring the law into ridicule.  To 
those troubled by the change in the law, we point out that the 
fundamental change occurred first in business practice.  The 
change in legal analysis does no more than reflect the change 
in methods of doing business.  To acknowledge standardized 
contracts for what they are—rules written by commercial 
enterprises—and to enforce them as written, subject to those 
reasonable limitations provided by law, is to recognize the 
reality of the marketplace as it now exists, while imposing 
just limits on business practice.  These, we think, have 
always been the proper functions of contract law.107 
 
107 Id. at 397–99.  Jeff Stempel has argued persuasively that the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations has been misconstrued narrowly and should instead be regarded as a general 
principle of contract interpretation that is not limited to the “strong” application of 
overcoming clearly worded policy language.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: 
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Judicial protection of reasonable expectations under click-wrap 
commercial contracts is simply a new iteration of the protections 
formerly provided by § 2-207 and is grounded in basic principles of 
contract law.108 
 
Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading 
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998).  Construed in this manner, the 
Doctrine would naturally be viewed as a part of general contract law. 
108 Judicial interpretation of § 2-207 has been guided by an effort to effectuate the 
underlying purpose of protecting reasonable expectations of commercial parties.  In its 
(relatively late) “first opportunity to consider a classic ‘battle of the forms’ scenario,” the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico articulated the reasonable expectations interpretation of 
§ 2-207 clearly and persuasively.  Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 
320 (N.M. 1993).  The court endorsed the modern approach to the contract formation rules 
of § 2-207, with the following explanation: 
Discerning whether “commercial understanding” dictates the existence 
of a contract requires consideration of the objective manifestations of 
the parties’ understanding of the bargain. . . . The question guiding the 
inquiry should be whether the offeror could reasonably believe that in 
the context of the commercial setting in which the parties were acting, a 
contract had been formed.  This determination requires a very fact 
specific inquiry. . . . Our analysis does not yield an iron clad rule 
conducive to perfunctory application.  However, it does remain true to 
the spirit of Article 2, as it calls the trial court to consider the 
commercial setting of each transaction and the reasonable expectations 
and beliefs of the parties acting in that setting. 
Id. at 324. 
It is important to emphasize that courts must apply the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations in a manner that does not focus solely on the subjective expectations of the 
complaining party.  James White argued forcefully against the revisions to Article 2 that 
would have adopted the “subjective” test of reasonable expectations seemingly embedded 
in Article 2.20 of the UNIDROIT principles, suggesting that this would wreak havoc for 
businesses.  See James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH U. 
L.Q. 315 (1997).  White properly challenges the move from the rule of Restatement § 211(3) 
that relief is available only if the party would not have agreed to the contract at all to the 
UNIDROIT rule focusing on whether the party could have expected the term in question, 
but in this article I propose a middle (still objective) ground.  My proposal fits comfortably 
within the scheme of Article 2 and reinstates the beneficial features of the § 2-207 force-
field. 
Professor White offers a more telling criticism, though, because his analysis shows that the 
courts in Arizona in fact adopted the subjective approach of the proposed revision to 
Article 2 despite their ostensible reliance on Restatement § 211(3) as a general rule of 
contract law.  Any common law doctrine is subject to abuse and misapplication, and so to 
this criticism, all that I can suggest is Llewellyn’s familiar belief that covert tools are 
unreliable tools, and that we would be far better off for courts to develop a jurisprudence of 
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 The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations fits within the 
conceptual structure of Article 2, as it is no more radical than the 
statutory definition of “agreement,” which includes, but is not limited 
to, the elements of “course of performance,” “course of dealing” and 
“trade usage,” terms that clearly respect reasonable expectations and 
reject a formalist approach to understanding the agreement.  In the 
Nanakuli case, the Ninth Circuit famously held that the price term 
“posted price at time of delivery” was to be construed as a price 
protection term that meant “posted price at time of delivery, but no 
higher than the posted price at time of contracting,” in accordance 
with the reasonable expectations of both parties generated by the 
course of dealing between the parties and established trade usages.109  
 
reasonable expectations openly, and therefore subject to the kind of analysis and criticism 
that White offers. 
109 See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1981).  This  
result might lead a casual observer to conclude that Article 2 pays insufficient heed to the 
need for certainty and predictability in commercial transactions, but the Nanakuli court 
was careful to apply the Code as written and intended: a course of dealing is established 
only where the prior interactions are “fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis 
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct,” U.C.C. § 1-303(b) 
(2006), and a trade usage is established only when the “regularity” of its observance is such 
as to “justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in 
question,” U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2006). 
It is difficult to argue that the course of dealing and trade usage should not be part of the 
agreement, although one might be skeptical as to whether the factual basis for this 
evidence has been established.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis 
of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 
(1999).  Bernstein states that “[u]sages of trade” and “commercial standards,” as those 
terms are used by the Code, may not consistently exist, even in relatively close-knit 
merchant communities.  While merchants in the industries examined here sometimes do 
and did act in ways amounting to loose behavioral regularities, most such regularities are 
either much more geographically local in nature or far more general in scope and 
conditional in form than is commonly assumed.  Id.  But see Macaulay, supra note 37, at 
788. 
Bernstein's empirical findings raise questions of evidence rather than challenge the entire 
approach of the U.C.C.  Why isn't it enough to say that one who wants to rely on a usage 
must prove it?  Professor Bernstein's admirable empirical work suggests that more often 
than we would have thought, a party will not be able to carry its burden of proving the 
existence and content of a usage. 
Macaulay notes that there certainly are trade usages that should be enforced (for example, 
an order for a “2 by 4” is satisfied when the seller provides a piece of wood measuring 
approximately 1 ¾” by 3 ½”), and in particular he comments on the compelling facts that 
justify the result in Nanakuli as being consistent with the agreement of the parties.  Id. at 
794–95.  See also David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: 
A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617 (2001). 
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Courts should extend the protection of “reasonable expectations” to 
the electronic contracting arena where parties are no longer protected 
by the force-field protections of § 2-207. 
 Although Article 2 embodies the principle of protecting reasonable 
expectations in many of its provisions, there is no clause akin to 
Restatement § 211 that would directly authorize an analysis of click-
wrap contracts through this lens.  Nevertheless, there is ample basis 
for courts to apply the Doctrine to transactions involving the sale of 
goods.110  First, the U.C.C. “must be liberally construed and applied” 
so as to “simplify, clarify, and modernize the law” and “to permit the 
continued expansion of commercial practices.”111  Inasmuch as the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is the best means for facilitating 
the legal regulation of a new form of contracting that has outstripped 
the force-field protection of § 2-207, courts are authorized to utilize 
the Doctrine to guide application of the provisions of Article 2.  
Second, the “principles of law and equity” relating to “validating or 
invalidating” causes continue to supplement the U.C.C. unless they 
have been displaced by a particular provision of the U.C.C.112  There 
simply is no sound basis to argue that the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations has been displaced by the U.C.C.  The definition of 
“agreement” looks to the commercial reality of the “bargain in fact” 
that engenders contractual expectations.  The obligation of good faith 
requires both parties to observe “reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing,”113 which amounts to the obligation to respect the other 
party’s reasonable expectations in the performance and enforcement 
of the contract.  Moreover, Article 2 provides numerous gap filling 
 
110 Llewellyn argued that the U.C.C. invited the enforcement of reasonable expectations 
through the general tools of good faith and unconscionability, and also by providing a 
model of protecting reasonable expectations in the many gap-filling provisions.  
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 369–70.  There is precedent for utilizing the doctrine to clarify 
troubling provisions in Article 2.  John Murray cogently argues that the only reliable means 
of interpreting the “part of the basis of the bargain test” under U.C.C. § 2-313 is to regard 
the test as a determination of the “reasonable expectations of the buyer.”  John E. Murray, 
Jr., ‛Basis of the Bargain’: Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283, 317–
18 (1982). 
111 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) and (2) (2006). 
112 U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2006).  For this reason, the U.C.C. is not a true code that displaces all 
other law with respect to transactions within its scope.  Comment 2 explains that 
“principles of common law and equity may supplement its provisions,” but “they may not 
be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect.” 
113 U.C.C. § 1-201(a)(20) (2006). 
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provisions that embody rules respecting the reasonable expectations 
of the parties.114  Finally, the provisions governing the formation of a 
sales agreement embrace a functionalist, rather than formalist, 
conception of contracting and should not be interpreted to demand a 
traditional contract analysis of click-wrap contracting.115 
 One can argue that applying the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations to contracting under Article 2 is an unwarranted break 
with the statutory scheme only if one unrealistically (which is to say, 
without historical or textual support) reads a strict formalist approach 
to contracting into Article 2.  As Allen Kamp has related, Article 2 was 
crafted in a functionalist time but was finalized and adopted in a 
formalist period, leading to a “freedom of contract” overlay on a 
“reasonable expectations” code.116  Article 2's polysemic character 
permits the judiciary to balance the values of freedom of contract and 
the protection of reasonable expectations.  There certainly is nothing 
 
114 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2000) (if not otherwise agreed, the price of the goods is a 
“reasonable price at time of delivery”); U.C.C. §  2-308(a) (2000) (if not otherwise agreed, 
the goods are to be tendered at the seller’s place of business); and U.C.C. §  2-309 (1) 
(2000) (if not otherwise agreed, the time for any action to be taken under a contract is “a 
reasonable time.”).  These provisions articulate what the parties would reasonably expect 
in the absence of agreement (broadly defined): the goods are tendered without having to be 
moved, and are sold for a reasonable price within a reasonable time. 
115 A contract is formed in any manner sufficient to show “agreement” (as defined, supra 
note 96 and the text accompanying note 106), and need not provide all of the necessary 
terms of the agreement so long as the parties intend to be bound and “there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”  Id. at § 2-204 (1), (3).  Courts can 
legitimately use the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in click-wrap cases to determine 
what “agreement” has been shown by the parties as to specific terms, without undermining 
the “agreement” that is designated in the form of a “blanket assent.”  As would happen 
formerly under the “knock-out” rule of § 2-207, in the absence of agreement on a particular 
term, the U.C.C.’s gap-filling provisions would control. 
116 After World War II, the collectivist, anti-laissez-faire ideals of the thirties faced the new 
challenge of McCarthyism.  Any admission or hint that the newly proposed commercial 
code was even remotely based on collectivist theories, or that it worked against individual 
bargaining, would have been disastrous.  As we have seen, freedom of contract, or at least 
an individual’s freedom of contract, is not a principle of the U.C.C.  A merchant’s freedom 
to bargain is hemmed in by “reasonableness,” the standard of good faith, the use of 
standard terms and meanings and non-disclaimable usage of trade.  The U.C.C., however, 
could not explicitly recognize these.  The U.C.C. was proposed for adoption in the fifties, 
which was the worst time to mention the Code’s bias against individual bargaining.  
Therefore, the U.C.C.’s explicit references to freedom of contract were added in the fifties 
for political reasons.  Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, 
Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 325, 395 
(1995). 
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in the text, purpose, or history of Article 2 that compels courts to 
adopt the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as proposed in this 
Article, but there is even more certainly nothing in the text, purpose, 
or history of Article 2 to preclude courts from doing so.  
 James Maxeiner has argued persuasively that the contemporary 
American debate about standard form contracts has ignored the rich 
history that European countries, especially Germany, have developed 
in this area.117  In the postwar years, German courts utilized general 
Code provisions similar to the doctrines of good faith and 
unconscionability to begin systematically addressing the problem of 
standardized terms.118  Maxeiner suggests that Llewellyn found 
inspiration for his theory of blanket assent in this case law, just as he 
found inspiration for the unconscionability provision of the U.C.C. in 
German case law from the prewar years.  The German legislature 
codified established case law principles in 1976; during the following 
two decades the German Supreme Court decided more than 1,500 
cases under the new provisions resulting in a robust jurisprudence in 
this area.119 
 The German code distinguishes “incorporation controls” from 
“content controls.”  Incorporation controls require that the terms were 
available to a party at the time of contracting, and probably are 
satisfied by modern click-wrap contracting.120  Content controls are 
 
117 James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: 
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L LAW 109 (2003).  Maxeiner discusses the adoption 
and implementation of EU Council Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993, that was designed 
to control unfair terms in consumer contracts.  This EU initiative drew from the broader 
German experience that was not limited to the consumer context.  Maxeiner’s point is that 
the Article 2 revision debacle occurred in virtually complete ignorance of these foreign 
approaches and developments.  He laments that the members of ALI and NCCUSL (now 
known as the ULC) “would have been able to observe standard terms control systems more 
extensive than section 2-302 in actual operation; they would not have had to guess whether 
such a system was even possible.”  Id. at 129.  See also Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, 
Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEVE. ST. L. 
REV. 175 (2006) (emphasizing consumer protection afforded by EU Directives); Jennifer S. 
Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of 
Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 223 
(2006) (analyzing the trend in foreign law to protect consumers from strong sellers and 
arguing that the amendment process for Article 2 would have benefited by drawing from 
these sources). 
118 Maxeiner, supra note 117, at 141–46. 
119 Id. at 149–51. 
120 Id. at 151–52, 166. 
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multilayered: one provision bans certain terms, another identifies 
suspect terms, and a third permits courts generally to invalidate terms 
that, contrary to the principle of good faith, place either party in an 
unreasonably disadvantaged position through obfuscation, by 
deviating materially from baseline legal norms, or by undermining the 
purpose of the contract.121  Maxeiner argues that the statutory 
provisions that evolved out of judicial interpretations of the German 
Code demonstrate the feasibility of regulating standard form 
agreements in a modern economy. 
Functioning systems for control of unfair standard terms 
exist in Europe.  These systems are more ambitious than the 
present-day American system.  Their very existence 
challenges complacency with current American law.  Their 
existence undermines the two principal arguments raised to 
support American law: there is no problem, and no system 
could better balance the competing interests of certainty of 
contract and fairness of terms.  Obviously, our European 
colleagues think that there is a problem, and they have taken 
action to deal with it.  The apparent success of the German 
contract model suggests that there may not be a necessary 
trade-off between control of unfair terms and predictable 
contracting. 
If the American system is less ambitious than its European 
counterparts and is largely limited to striking down terms 
that “shock the conscience,” it has not been by design.  When 
American legislatures enacted U.C.C. section § 2-302, they 
adopted a provision that its drafters hoped would allow 
American courts to develop “machinery” for “policing” 
contract terms.  The German Supreme Court’s development 
of such machinery from essentially the same starting point 
largely confirms the vision of the drafters of the U.C.C.122 
 
121 Id. at 152–56.  Section 305(1) provides that terms “individually negotiated between the 
parties” are not standard terms, and § 305(2) incorporates standard terms “only if” the 
drafter “expressly draws the other party’s attention to them,” and “gives the other party . . . 
the possibility of gaining knowledge of their content, and if the other party agrees that they 
are to apply.”  Id. at 177.  
122 Id. at 171–72.  Section 308 specifies clauses whose validity depends upon an evaluation 
by courts, and § 309 specifies clauses that are invalid.  Id. at 178–79.  The general content 
control provision of § 307 provides as follows: 
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The German experience shows that efforts to delineate principles of 
general contract law able to take into account the realities of modern 
contracting are not radical efforts to be feared; rather, they are organic 
developments that hold true to the conceptual structure of contract 
law. 
 Maxeiner’s arguments in favor of a legislative solution or a 
reinvigoration of unconscionability doctrine are not persuasive in the 
current context, for reasons discussed above.  Given the angst 
surrounding the revision of Article 2, it is highly implausible at this 
time that a sober and balanced legislative solution can be achieved.123  
Moreover, the doctrine of unconscionability has been cast as a 
specialized consumer protection device; as such, it is unlikely to serve 
as a compelling basis for dealing with commercial contracts.  
However, Maxeiner’s analysis does lend strong support to my 
argument that courts should develop the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations as a general feature of contract law to govern 
commercial parties engaged in electronic contracting.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, as embodied in 
Restatement § 211, is similar to the German regulation of standard 
form agreements.  Both focus on avoiding unfair surprise and the 
evisceration of dickered terms.  Llewellyn’s solution to the battle of the 
 
(1) Provisions in standard terms are invalid if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user 
at an unreasonable disadvantage.  An unreasonable disadvantage may 
also result from the fact that the provision is not clear and 
comprehensible. 
(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a 
provision 1. can not be reconciled with essential basic principles of the 
statutory rule from which it deviates, or 2. restricts essential rights or 
duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner that 
there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved. 
Id. at 178. 
123 Llewellyn would almost certainly argue that, in the present circumstances, courts must 
take the lead by fashioning a response to the emerging contracting conditions.  Any future 
legislative solution should work from this judicial basis and facilitate additional creative 
applications of the statutory principles to dynamic commercial settings.  See supra note 
84.  This is the nature of Article 2: it was crafted on the basis of the wisdom generated by 
judicial interpretations of the Uniform Sales Act and was drafted to ensure that courts 
continued to apply the provisions with attention to context. 
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forms famously divides the question of whether there is a contract 
from a determination of the terms; as § 2-207 fades from relevance, 
the policing of commercial contracts should continue to divide 
questions of incorporation and control when dealing with click-wrap 
contracts.  In short, the lessons that comparative commercial law 
might teach American judges fit well with the developing history and 
guiding principles of Article 2, and are best framed by the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations. 
 All this having been said, and despite an expected vocal protest 
that my thesis will lead to unbounded litigation, I predict that the 
circumstances in which a commercial party has a viable claim that one 
or more click-wrap terms should not be enforced under the Doctrine 
of Reasonable Expectations will be relatively rare.  This was also the 
case in the battle of the forms scenario, where parties exchanged 
forms and then dealt with each other with business goals in mind.  As 
ultimately construed and applied, § 2-207 was beneficial when the 
business relationship soured and parties sought a realistic 
interpretation of their bargain and a determination of their respective 
duties.  The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations can serve a similar 
role by regulating click-wrap contracting for goods.  It is time for both 
the courts and commentators to recall the wisdom of Llewellyn and 
others at the dawn of the widespread use of standard-form adhesion 
contracts, to draw from the contemporary experiences of other highly 
industrialized countries, and begin at long last to articulate the 
contours of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations. 
